REVISITING FOUR POPULAR MYTHS ABOUT THE
PEYOTE CASE

John P. Forren7
At least within the church-state community, one is hard pressed to
find a Supreme Court ruling held in lower esteem than Employment
Division v. Smith.1 According to many commentators, Smith marked
an abrupt and nonsensical departure from a decades-old practice of
safeguarding religiously motivated conduct under the Free Exercise
Clause. At least since Sherbert v. Verner, religious objectors who had
challenged burdensome public policies-even facially neutral oneshad enjoyed a general First Amendment presumption in favor of exemption unless government officials could show both a compelling
state interest and least restrictive means.2 Yet in Smith, a sharply divided Court displaced this general strict scrutiny standard in favor of
a long-dormant rule rooted in Reynolds v. United States.5 Henceforth
under the Free Exercise Clause, Smith declared, instances of overt religious discrimination by government would still trigger the most
stringent form of judicial review. But when a generally applicable
policy merely created an incidental burden on religion, the First
Amendment would generally require no special justification at all.4
Despite its remarkable unpopularity across the ideological spectrum, Smith has remained the Court's leading pronouncement on the
scope of First Amendment free exercise rights for the past fifteen
years. During that time, a substantial body of conventional wisdom
has developed, among both experts and more casual observers, about
the core First Amendment mandate in Smith and its practical impact
on religious freedoms. Indeed, at least four basic suppositions about
Smith have become so widely accepted that they now stand essentially
as "seminal truths" in many contemporary discussions of free exercise
rights. First, commentators often suggest, judicially enforced protections
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for First Amendment free exercise rights were much stronger across-the-boardin
the period prior to Smith. During the Sherbert era, the more strident
rhetoric suggests, religious interests enjoyed a kind of Golden Age
during which judges enforced the Free Exercise Clause much more
consistently than today to shield religious minorities against the acts
of intolerant or insensitive political majorities. 5 Second, the 'common wisdom' continues, the Smith decision marked a clean and complete
doctrinal break with the more protective First Amendment doctrines of the
Sherbert era. Prior to 1990, that is, the Court's controlling precedents required close scrutiny of governmental burdens-but in Smith,
a majority of the Justices unambiguously jettisoned those longstanding rules in favor of a flat 'no exemptions' approach.6 Third,
the prevailing view tells us, free exercise litigants since Smith have lost consistently on the First Amendment merits in the lower federal and state courts.
Since Smith, that is, any free exercise litigants dedicated enough to
continue pursuing First Amendment exemptions claims in the wake
of Smith have almost invariably come away disappointed in the lower
courts. And finally, this logic concludes, such across-the-board claim
failures were made inevitable by Smith because lower federal and state
court judges necessarily have adhered to the Supreme Court's command that

courts essentially vacate the field.
These four commonly held beliefs about Smith and the post-Smith
condition of free exercise rights have played a critical role in shaping
the contours of public debate in recent years. In fact, broad concerns
about Smith's effects on religious minorities have fueled bipartisan efforts in Congress and in at least a dozen state legislatures to "restore"
Sherbert-era legal protections in state and federal statutes.7 Yet in the
public record, the empirical support for these views often consists of
little more than scattered anecdotes and references back to common
wisdom. To be sure, a number of well-documented cases have established that Smith has been a catastrophe for religious freedom in some

5 See, e.g., GREGG IVERS, REDEFINING THE FIRST FREEDOM 173 (1993) (bemoaning the fate of
religious minorities in the wake of Smith); Editorial, The Necessity of Religion: The High Court Says
Religious Freedom is a Luxury-Wrong, L.A. TIMES, April 19, 1990, at B6 (calling the Smith decision

"pure legal adventurism").
6

See, e.g., William Bentley Ball, High Court Goes Cold on Religious Liberty, LA. TIMES, April 22,

1990, at M7 (stating that Smith "opens up a constitutional fault of San Andreas proportions"); C.
Lacy Thompson, Joint Committee Says Peyote Case Affects Religious Liberty, BAPTIST NEW MEXICAN,

May 26, 1990, at 6 (quoting Oliver Thomas of the BaptistJoint Committee on Public Affairs that
Smith "essentially writes the Free Exercise Clause right out of the Constitution"); Resolution of
the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. (May 18, 1990) (on file with the edi-

tors) (expressing "extreme outrage and distress" that the Supreme Court had "in effect nullified the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment").
7

See LOUIS FISHER, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS
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(discussing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act enacted by Congress); JOHN P. FORREN, IN
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circumstances.8 But absent a fuller examination of the historical record-one, incidentally, that advocates of strengthened legal protections have no particular incentive to carry out-society really can only
guess whether the horror stories of religious oppression and insensitivity that inform contemporary discussions of Smith are indeed representative of a larger post-Smith pattern or are merely exceptions to a
less alarming but largely unrecognized norm.
In this article, I set out to examine these "givens" about Smith in
light of the Supreme Court's Sherbert-era case law and the lower
courts' initial post-Smith dispositions of First Amendment exemptions
claims. And what becomes clear in the end is that every one of the
four views listed above reflects at best an incomplete understanding
of the Supreme Court's twentieth century case law and more recent
developments in the field. Contrary to the popular lore, that is, a
close look back at the historical record reveals that (1) the Supreme
Court itself was hardly consistent even before Smith in extending First
Amendment protections to those seeking to follow the tenets of religious faith; (2) in Smith itself, the Justices did not overturn Sherbert-era
free exercise precedents so much as redefine them in a novel-and by
no means unequivocal-manner; (3) the lower courts after Smith,
rather than abandoning the free exercise field, actually continued in
many cases-at least during the period under review here-to grant
relief from incidental burdens under the Free Exercise Clause; and
(4) the lower courts have often granted this relief, despite Smith, after
undertaking a serious Sherbert-like balancing of the particular religious and public interests at hand. The popular view of Smith, in
other words, is significantly off the mark in several respects. Free exercise rights were never really as well protected by courts before Smith
as we are now inclined to believe. And as for the post-Smith period, a
number of considerations suggest that perhaps the situation is not as
bad for religious interests as we might think.

S

See, e.g., Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of The Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993) (apply-

ing the Smith test to find that Ohio State University did not violate the Free Exercise Clause
when it did not allow a veterinary student to use a religious claim to excuse herself from performing terminal surgeries on live animals); Intercommunity Ctr. for Justice & Peace v. INS,
910 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1990) (heavily citing Smith in finding that the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 did not violate the Free Exercise Clause); St. Bartholomew's Church v. City
of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990) (using the Smith test to find that New York's Landmark Law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause); Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 58 (D.R.I.
1990) (relying upon Smith to find that a generally applicable and facially neutral Rhode Island
law on autopsies did not violate the Free Exercise Clause); United States v. Phila. Yearly Meeting
of the Religious Soc'y of Friends, 753 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (applying Smith to find that
a mandatory federal tax that supported the military did not violate the free exercise rights of a
Quaker group).
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I. FOUR COMMONLY HELD BELIEFS ABOUT SMITHAND THE POST-SMITH
CONDITION OF FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS

A. Myth #1: Pre-Smith First Amendment Law Vigorously ProtectedReligious
Practicesfrom Regulation
To be sure, Employment Division v. Smith represented a serious curtailment by the Supreme Court of First Amendment rights to exercise
religious faith. Indeed, as noted above, the mandate in Sherbert v.
Verner had required government officials to carve out special accommodations for religiously motivated actions in a broad array of public
policy fields. And the Court itself, in a number of pre-Smith decisions,
led the way in this regard by mandating that state officials treat religiously motivated litigants differently because of the incidental burdens created by otherwise valid state law. Thus in four cases-Thomas
v. Review Board,9 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,'0 Frazee v.
d 2
Illinois Department of Employment Security" and of course, Sherbert
' itself-the Justices applied strict scrutiny to require religious exemptions from state unemployment compensation rules that had effectively conditioned the eligibility for benefits on a willingness to forego
religious practices. In three other Sherbert-era rulings, most prominently in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, the Court used
the Free Exercise clause to effectively shield religious organizations
from liability imposed by otherwise applicable property and employment law doctrines."3 And in Wisconsin v. Yoder, an effectively unanimous Court mandated an exemption for Amish parents from a generally applicable and facially neutral criminal law requiring
attendance at school through the tenth grade. 4
No doubt, then, the Free Exercise Clause had significant teeth at
times during the Sherbert era. Still, to infer from Sherbert, Yoder, and
Serbian Eastern Orthodox the oft-cited proposition that free exercise
rights were consistently defended by courts with such vigor before
Smith is to overlook a considerable amount of evidence to the contrary-including several other pre-Smith rulings by the Supreme Court

' 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
10480 U.S. 136 (1987).
1 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
12 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
13 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696 (1976); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). See also Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952)
(holding that a New York statute, as applied to the appointment of clergy, violated the Free Exercise Clause).
14 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215-20 (1972).
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in which the Justices showed considerably less concern over the requirements that conduct be based in religious faith. On two occasions during the 1980s, for instance, in practice the Justices watered
down the Sherbert test by raising the bar for what counted as a substantial burden on religion-the threshold showing, under Sherbert, that a
claimant had to make before the compelling state interest-least restrictive means test ever came into play. In Tony and Susan Alamo
Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, the Court unanimously dismissed a religious foundation's claim for exemption from the Fair Labor Standards Act without any balancing of interests at all after concluding,
despite protests to the contrary, that the statute's minimum wage and
overtime provisions did not interfere significantly with the organization's exercise of religious beliefs. 15 Similarly, the Justices in Hernandez v. Commissioner upheld the Internal Revenue Service's disallowance of charitable tax deductions for Scientologists' "auditing" and
"training" fees without any serious consideration of the competing
public and religious interests at hand. 6 Church of Scientology members, the Hernandez Court ruled, had failed to overcome the Justices'
doubts that the IRS ruling in 7question had restricted religious conduct to any substantial degree.
In at least two other pre-Smith rulings during the 1980s, the Justices weakened the Sherbert standard in another way-by defining the
"compelling" state interests at stake in remarkably broad terms and
then weighing the overall threat that countless hypothetical exemptions together would pose to it. In United States v. Lee, the Justices
conceded that requiring an Old Order Amish farmer to pay social security payroll taxes for his employees constituted a substantial burden
on the exercise of religious beliefs.'8 Yet no First Amendment exemption was required, the Lee majority ruled, because the "broad public
interest in maintaining a sound tax system" would be imperiled by
"myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs."
Similarly, in Bob Jones University v. United States, an eight-Justice majority conceded that denying federal tax-exempt status to a religiously
affiliated school that discriminates on the basis of race would indeed
have a "substantial impact" on the school's religious mission. 0 Yet,
the Court ruled, the federal government has a "fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education" that

5

471 U.S. 290, 304 (1985).
490 U.S. 680 (1989).

IS

Id. at 700.
455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
Id. at 260.

2'

461 U.S. 574 (1983).

"
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were
could not be served if every school with religious objections
2
it. '
given free rein under the First Amendment to undermine

Even before Smith, then, the "strict scrutiny" test often proved to
be less "strict" in practice than it often seems to be in other constitutional fields.22 At the same time, the Justices in the immediate preSmith years also undermined the vitality of Sherbert even more directly
in at least three additional decisions by explicitly excluding selected
fields of public policy from any heightened form of judicial scrutiny
at all. In Goldman v. Weinberger, the Court ruled that military regulations need only have a rational basis in order to survive a Free Exercise Clause challenge. In light of the military's special requirements
of discipline and esprit de corps, the Goldman majority explained, a
greater-than-usual degree of judicial deference to the government's
asserted needs was appropriate.2 4 A year later, in O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, the Justices then excepted challenges to prison regulations
and policies from a general Sherbert analysis. 5 Incidental restrictions
on inmates' spiritual practices, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in
O'Lone, need only be "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."26 And finally, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, the Justices established a third discrete exception to the general Sherbert test for challenges by religious litigants to the internal
management practices of government agencies. Thus, Lyng held, no
balancing of interests was required when evaluating a free exercise
challenge to a federal agency's plan to build roads through sacred
Native American sites. The land in question was part of a national
forest, and the First Amendment simply does "not28 divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land.,
Of course, standing alone, decisions such as Lyng, Goldman, and
O'Lone may not tell us a lot about the vitality of Sherbert-era protections for free exercise as a general matter. But taken together, these
rulings-along with several others just surveyed-serve, at the very

Id. at 603.
Cf United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318 (1990) (overturning the federal Flag Protection Act of 1989 due to its failure to meet "the most exacting scrutiny"); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (subjecting the state interest in a Texas flag-burning ban to the "the
most exacting scrutiny"); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971) (overturning Arizona and Pennsylvania alien-residency statutes because they failed to meet the "compelling state
interest test" of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause).
2

"

"5 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
24

Id. at 506-07 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)).
482 U.S. 342 (1987).

Id. at 349 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).
' 485 U.S. 439 (1988). See also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 712 (1986) (holding that a statutory requirement that applicants provide a social security number in order to receive benefits
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
2 Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
2
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least, as powerful reminders for us not to get too carried away in contrasting the Smith ruling with its immediate predecessors. The Justices' own pre-Smith record in free exercise cases was, after all, decidedly mixed even during the now-so-highly-esteemed Sherbert period.
Not only had a remarkable number of incidental governmental burdens on religion survived the Court's "strict scrutiny" test in the years
leading up to Smith; what is more, the Justices had carved out enough
discrete exceptions to the general Sherbert standard that the constitutional rules in the area had already begun to resemble doctrinal Swiss
cheese.
B. Myth #2: Smith CategoricallyRepudiated the Sherbert
Strict Scrutiny Standard
Just as pre-Smith First Amendment doctrines were actually more
complex than commentators now often suggest, it also seems, upon
closer look, that the Smith Court's repudiation of those doctrines was
much less categorical and unambiguous than is now commonly portrayed. Indeed, a look back to early 1990 suggests that an overly simplistic view of Smith's reasoning took hold almost immediately within
the legal and religious liberty communities. Boalt Hall'sJesse Choper,
for instance, declared within hours of the Court's ruling that Smith
had eviscerated the First Amendment's protections for religious action in "the most radical doctrinal change in years., 29 The University
of Texas's Douglas Laycock likewise labeled the decision "a substantial repealer of the modem free exercise clause," which allowed "a
legislature with even a moderate amount of cleverness to suppress religious acts whenever its chooses." 30 For ProfessorJohn Nowak of the
University of Illinois, the Court's decision had "shut[] the door on
free exercise claims. 3 ' Erwin Chemerinsky, then at UCLA's law
school, observed that after Smith, "it is hard to 3imagine
a claim of in2
succeed.
could
that
exercise
free
of
fringement

Richard C. Reuben, Use of Peyote Isn't ProtectedReligious Rite, L.A. DAILYJ., Apr. 18, 1990, at
24 [hereinafter Reuben, Use of Peyote] (quoting Choper). Choper, incidentally, served as an advisor to the State of Oregon for the Smith case.
" Id. at 24 (quoting Laycock); see also Douglas Laycock, Watering Down the Free-ExerciseClause,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, May 16-23, 1990, at 519 ("It would be hyperbole to say that Smith repeals
the free-exercise clause ....It is not hyperbole to say that Smith reduces the free-exercise clause
to a cautious redundancy ....[I]t
is hard to imagine a case in which the court's decision would
actually depend on the free-exercise clause.").
:I Reuben, Use of Peyote, supra note 29, at 24 (quoting Nowak).
2 Erwin Chemerinsky, Church, State and Peyote: Farewell to Freedom of
Religion: State Now Has
Free Rein to Meddle, L.A. DAILYJ., May 11, 1990, at 6; see also Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., How
the Court Went Astray in the Peyote Case, L.A. DAILYJ., May 11, 1990, at 6 (arguing that Smith "reduc[ed] the free-exercise provision to a virtual nullity").
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Leaders of religious and civil liberties groups quickly joined the
chorus. Robert Dugan, Jr. of the National Association of Evangelicals, for example, declared flatly that Smith had "taken the Free Exercise Clause and emptied it of meaning. 3s Oliver Thomas of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs concurred, noting that Smith
had "essentially written the free exercise clause right out of the Constitution. 3 4 The National Council of Churches lamented in turn that
"religious claims to the protection of the Free Exercise Clause have
been stripped of that defense. 3 5 The Smith decision, added Americans United for Separation of Church and State, suddenly and callously "le [ft] religious minorities at the mercy of state legislatures and
the federal government." 6
In light of the Court's abdication of the constitutional field, such
critics agreed, the government could now trample on a wide variety
of religious practices with complete impunity. Religiously minded
individuals could be prevented under generally applicable policies
from consuming sacramental wine during communion or kiddush,
wearing religious garments to school or work, taking time off for religious holidays, slaughtering animals in traditional ways, or working
under religious vows of poverty.37 In the same vein, religious organizations-regardless of any religion-based objection-could now be

" Statement of Robert Dugan, Jr., Executive Director, National Association of Evangelicals
(May 10, 1990) (on file with author) (observing that Smith had taken the Free Exercise Clause
and emptied it of meaning).
" C. Lacy Thompson, Joint Committee Says Peyote Case Affects Religious Liberty, BAPTIST NEW
MEXICAN, May 26, 1990, at 6 (quoting Thomas).
" See Statement of Dean Kelley, Director for Religious Liberty, National Council of
Churches (May 11, 1990) (on file with the editors). Also, the General Board of the National
Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. passed a resolution on May 18, 1990 which expressed "extreme outrage and distress" that the Supreme Court had "in effect nullified the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment." Resolution of the National Council of Churches of
Christ in the U.S.A., The Voiding of the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution (May 18,
1990) (on file with the editors).
3 Media Announcement, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Broader
Impact of the Peyote Decision (April 20, 1990) (on file with author).
" See, e.g., David Friedman, Court Decision Could MakeJewish Rituals Illegal,JEWISH PRESS, May
1, 1990 (quoting Rabbi Henry Siegman of the American Jewish Congress who warned that Smith
could "result in making illegal such Jewish ritual practices as drinking wine from kiddush, the
slaughter of kosher meat and circumcision. . ."); Richard Reuben, Free Exercise: Now You See
It ..,L.A. DAILYJ., April 24, 1990 (suggesting that under Smith a Catholic priest would not have
a constitutional right to give wine to a child during communion); StephenJ. Solarz, The Court's
Erosion of Religious Freedom, NEWSDAY, August 23, 1990, at 71 [hereinafter Solarz, The Court'sErosion] ("Americans who eat kosher meat, use wine in religious ceremonies, circumcise their children, wear religiously mandated garment, or seek time off from work for religious observance
may no longer be able to rely on the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion."); Letter from Stephen Solarz et al., (June 27, 1990) (on file with the editors) (urging
members of the U.S. House of Representatives to support a bill that would "restore the protections for the free exercise of religion to the traditional standard that existed prior to the Smith
decision").
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compelled to ordain women, cancel plans to expand church buildings, employ openly homosexual or unmarried pregnant persons, terminate unlicensed parochial school teachers, distribute condoms to
church school students, or perform abortions at church-affiliated
hospitals.3s A spokesperson for the Baptist Joint Committee stated
this view succinctly in aJune 1990 newsletter; after Smith, he declared,
generally applicable laws and regulations now "apply to local
churches as well as the Holiday Inn., 9 The full range of religiously
motivated actions, it seemed, now stood at the mercy of unrestrained
political majorities.
Such alarmist readings of Smith, as noted above, have remained a
fixture in mainstream legal and political commentary up to the present day.40 Yet to a significant extent, they downplay the simple fact
that Smith never explicitly overruled anything. Rather, Justice Scalia's
majority opinion merely recast the rulings in Sherbert, Yoder, and other
leading precedents as marginal exceptions to a flat "no exemptions"
rule that, according to Smith, had always stood as the general standard for resolving constitutional rights claims in this field. To be
sure, almost no one in the field has accepted Justice Scalia's reinterpretation of history in this manner at face value; indeed, even ardent
supporters of the Smith rule have derided Scalia's reorganization of
38 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REv. 1 (arguing that
Smith would allow for significant legislative regulation of religious practices); Douglas Laycock,
The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise, and the Supreme Court Brief That Was Never Filed, 8 J.L. &
RELIGION 99, 108-09 (1990) [hereinafter Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault] (arguing that the
Smith ruling could result in religious groups being required to ordain women and homosexuals,
and in students and public employees being penalized for observing religious holidays); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109,
1142-43 (1990) (listing a number of examples of possible restrictions of religious practices resulting from the Smith decision); Joan Biskupic, Animal Sacrifice Ban Tests Religion Rites, WASH.
POST, Nov. 1, 1992, at Al (discussing the impact of the Smith decision on regulation regarding
animal sacrifice in religious practice); William D. Siegel, High Court Erodes Religious Rights,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 16, 1992, at 113 (listing holdings that have used Smith to undermine religious
freedom); Solarz, The Courts Erosion, supra note 37, at 71 (requesting support for the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1990 to protect religious diversity); Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 29, 1992, at 10 (regarding the concern of civil liberties groups and religious organizations that Smith would restrict religious freedom).
" Oliver Thomas, Views of the Wall REPORT FROM CAPITAL (Baptist Joint Comm. and Pub.
Affairs),June 1990, at 6.

0 See, e.g., IVERS, supra note 5, at 173 ("The Smith decision demolishes the constitutional protection that, for the better part of four decades, had shielded unorthodox religious conduct
from the legislative will of intolerant majorities... . The Court's new understanding of the free
exercise clause drains it of any real substantive meaning."); Robert F. Drinan & Jennifer I.
Huffman, Religious Freedom and the Oregon v. Smith and Hialeah Cases, 35 J. CHURCH & ST. 19, 35
(1993) ("Smith offers up religions to the legislatures .... "); Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault,
supra note 38, at 99 (noting in the Journal of Law & Religion that Smith "removes many of the
issues discussed in this journal from the scope of positive constitutional law"); Editorial, Freedom
of Religion at the High Court: Will the RFRA Survive?, 50 CHURCH & ST. 11, 11 (1997) (stating that
Smith "all but eviscerated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause").
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precedents as "border [ing] on fiction" and "particularly illustrative of
poetic license."" Yet the fact remains that in Smith, Justice Scalia distinguished rather than discarded Sherbert, Yoder, Thomas, and a number of other heightened scrutiny precedents. As a consequence,
Smith ultimately left behind not a clear and categorical "no exemptions" command as many have suggested, but rather ajumbled mix of
controlling Free Exercise Clause principles that arguably left ample
room for judges to resolve free exercise cases in any number of ways.
More specifically, Justice Scalia insisted in Smith that the Court's
Sherbert-era rulings all fit within two discrete-and heretofore unacknowledged-exceptions to general First Amendment principles for
certain specific types of free exercise claims. Thus in Yoder, Scalia
wrote, the Justices had applied heightened scrutiny only because of
the "hybrid" nature of the constitutional claims at hand. Scalia explained:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such
as freedom of speech and of the press or the right of parents to direct the
education of their children. Some of our cases prohibiting compelled
expression, decided exclusively upon free speech grounds, have also involved freedom of religion. And it is easy to envision a case in which a
challenge on freedom of association grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns.
The Yoder Court, in other words, had indeed applied strict scrutiny-but only because of the peculiar mix of religion and substantive
due process/parental rights issues raised by the Amish claimants in
that case. For the same reasons, Scalia added, a number of other "religion-plus-something-else" cases had been decided under a Sherbertlike strict scrutiny analysis as well. Yet all that these various precedents had really established, Scalia insisted in Smith, was the First
Amendment rule that hybrid free exercise claims were to be scrutinized closely by the courts. Ordinary exemptions claims like those in
Smith, on the other hand-claims, that is, which stood "unconnected
with any communicative activity or parental right ' 43 still fell under the
general First Amendment "no exemptions" rule instead.
Scalia similarly distinguished Sherbert with another newly minted
First Amendment label. That case, Scalia declared, had been decided
under strict scrutiny only because it had involved an "individualized
"' See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
308, 309 n.3 (1991) (critiquing Smith).
4' Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (internal citations
and quotations
omitted).
41

Id. at 882.
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44
governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct."
He elaborated:
Under the Sherbert test, governmental actions that substantially burden a
religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest.... [But] [w]e have never invalidated any government action on the
basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation....
[A] distinctive feature of unemployment compensation programs is
that their eligibility criteria invite consideration of the particular circumstances behind an applicant's unemployment: "The statutory conditions
[in Sherbert ... ] provided that a person was not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits if, 'without good cause,' he had quit work or
refused available work. The 'good cause' standard created a mechanism

for individualized exemptions.

45

Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie, in other words, had been decided

under strict scrutiny not because they were free exercise cases per se
but instead for a more specific reason: the relevant policy administrators in those instances had already been in the regular business of
determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether circumstances warrant
an exception from an otherwise general legal rule. So, as Scalia
summarized this "individualized governmental assessments" exception: "Our decisions in the unemployment cases stand [only] for the
proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual
exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason. 4 Accordingly, Scalia
concluded, Sherbert really had "nothing to do with an across-the-board
criminal prohibition" like the peyote law at issue in Smithy.
By crafting these two new "exceptional" categories in First Amendment law, Scalia thus accomplished a remarkable feat of doctrinal reconstruction: he effectively shuttled each of the Court's leading free
exercise precedents to the periphery of First Amendment doctrine
without openly overruling any of them. Yet the effect, in practical
terms, was that Smith left lower court judges-at least initially, in the
absence of subsequent Supreme Court clarifications-with extraordinary amounts of doctrinal leeway to decide precisely what controlling
First Amendment precedents now required them to do. As Bertrand
Fry has suggested, almost every conceivable free exercise claim could
be plausibly labeled, under Scalia's open-ended reasoning, a Yoderlike "hybrid" case.48 Similarly, as Michael McConnell noted soon after
Id. at 884.
Id. at 883-84 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 884.
:7 Id.
8 See Bertrand Fry, Note, Breeding Constitutional Doctrine: The Provenance and Progeny of the
"Hybrid Situation" in Current Free ExerciseJurisprudence, 71 TEx. L. REv. 833, 857 (1993) ("Al'4
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Smith was decided, virtually every type of government action could be
cast as involving some kind of "individualized assessment" of the sort
found by Scalia in Sherbert 49 As a result, a certain amount of postSmith "lawmaking" was probably inevitable in the lower federal and
state courts. Even those judges most deeply committed to stare decisis and to the Supreme Court's superior institutional authority may
have had no option but to settle open policy questions in light of the
new uncertainties in controlling First Amendment law. And for those
judges already inclined to resist, the ambiguities in Smith provided
plenty of legitimating
doctrinal cover for the exercise of autonomous
• 50
policy choice.
C. Myth #3: After Smith, Litigants Can No LongerPrevailon the First
Amendment Merits
Smith, in other words, did not necessarily require that every free
exercise claim be rejected by the courts. And indeed, a comprehensive look at lower court decisions from one post-Smith period-April
18, 1990 (when Smith was decided) through November 16, 1993
(when the Smith "rule" was supplanted, albeit temporarily, by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 5 )-shows that lower federal and
state court judges did not simply abandon this field in the wake of the
Justices' dramatic policy change in Smith. The conventional wisdom
about Smith tells us that there have been virtually no "wins" for free
exercise litigants under the First Amendment since Smith. But the
outcomes data summarized in Table 1 tell a somewhat more complicated story:

though Justice Scalia also does not expressly include a hybrid situation of free exercise with
equal protection of suspect classes ... this alliance seems possible.").
' See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1109, 1123 (1990) (noting that various examples of individualized assessment can be
found when looking at the Supreme Court's free exercise cases).
o See Lawrence Baum, Lower Court Responses to Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsideringa Negative
Picture,3JuST. SYs.J. 208, 211 (1977-78) (asserting that "ambiguity may give ajudge leeway with
which to reconcile resistance to the thrust of a Supreme Court policy with acceptance of the
Court's authority asjudicial leader").
SI Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993
U.S.C.CA.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidatedby City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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TABLE 1. WIN-Loss RATIO OF FREE EXERCISE
CLAIMS DECIDED ON MERITS
APRIL 18, 1990 (SMITH)-NOVEMBER 16, 1993 (RFRA)
Policy Field

Total

Accepted on Merits

Total
Prisoner petitions
Judicial process
Education regulation
Internal affairs of
religious institutions
Child custody/visitation
Employment
Property regulation
Torts/contracts
Taxes
Government operations
Medical care/autopsy
Anti-discrimination
/civil rights
Drug regulation
Public welfare
programs
Leafleting, soliciting,
proselytizing

Rejected on Merits

State/D

8
9
2

0
4
1

12
5
2
1
3
1
0
2

7
5
1
1
2
1
0
1

Total

ed

Stte/DC

99
20
18

94
7
13

5
13
5

2
2

8
6

2
1

1
1

1
0

6
5

4
3

6

1

0

1

5

1

5

1

1

0

4

3

7

0

0

0

7

7

0

18

2

2

0

16

13

3

334

52
(15.6%)

27

25

282
(84.4%)

198

84

Licensing/accreditation
of religious institutions
Misc. criminal law
Bankruptcy
Military regulations
Police procedures
Copyright law
Motor vehicle
regulation
Adoption
Establishment Clause
issues
Unspecified/
vague/other
Totals

Needless to say, Table 1 confirms that the initial post-Smith period
was a rather difficult one overall for litigants seeking judicial relief
under the Free Exercise Clause. During the first forty-three months
in which Smith stood as the Court's leading free exercise precedent,
federal and state judges overall rejected almost eighty-five percent of
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all First Amendment exemptions claims decided on the merits. In
ten different categories of cases, moreover, lower courts denied every
substantive free exercise claim they reached. Still, the most significant finding for our purposes is not that most litigants ultimately
failed on the First Amendment merits after Smith-in fact, earlier
studies suggest that such lopsided win-loss ratios were the norm even
before Smith-but rather that roughly fifteen percent of litigants seeking post-Smith First Amendment relief did not fail.52 Smith, in other
words, clearly did not render the Free Exercise Clause a nullity in
every case. To the contrary, even after Smith, individuals were apparently treated in a special manner at times by courts because they were
being burdened in the practice of religion by otherwise applicable
government policies. Religious institutions sometimes continued to
receive special treatment in law due to the judicially enforced requirements of the Free Exercise Clause as well.
D. Myth #4: After Smith, FreeExercise Litigants No Longer Receive
MeaningfulJudicialReview

The outcomes summarized above suggest, among other things,
that not withstanding Smith, lower courts must have continued to
evaluate some free exercise exemptions more closely than the conventional wisdom suggests. And indeed, a close examination of the
opinions issued by the lower federal and state courts in the cases
summarized above reveal that Smith did not, as critics feared, simply
pre-empt the Sherbert-era doctrinal field. To the contrary, the lower
federal and state courts' post-Smith opinions reveal that most free exercise claims failed only after judges evaluated their merits under a
considerable variety of constitutional tests. Table 2 summarizes the
frequency with which these courts applied various decisional standards as controlling tests in the period under consideration:

" SeeJames E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment,
78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1417 (1992) (reporting a 12.4% success rate for free exercise claimants in
the federal courts of appeals in the ten years prior to Smith); Frank H. Way, Jr. & Barbara Burt,
Religious Marginality and the Free Exercise Clause, 77 AM. POL. SC. REv. 652, 654 (1983) (finding a
claim success rate under the Free Exercise Clause of 12.1% for the 1946-1956 period); Anthony
A. Cavallo, The Free Exercise of Religion: Is it Truly Free or Merely Convenient to the States?
(Spring 1990) (unpublished paper, cited in Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse,
1993 BYU L. REv. 117, 121-22) (finding a success rate within a sample of nearly 100 pre-Smith
state and federal decisions of 16%).
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TABLE 2. FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS EMPLOYED BY LOWER COURTS
TO DECIDE FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS ON THE MERITS
APRIL 18, 1990 (SMn'H)-NOVEMBER 16,1993 (RFRA)
Free Exercise Test

NI(9

Claim Accepted on Merits
N
Fed State/DC
1
1
0
12
6
6

N
69

Fed
43

State/DC
26

23

11

12

0
0
1
10

83
6
11
5

78
5
6
0

5
1
5
5

4

5

26

15

11

4

1

3

59

40

19

52

27

25

282

198

84

Smith

70 (21.0%)

Compelling interest

35 (10.5%)

O'Lone/reasonableness
Lyng/Lee
Balancing
Serbian Eastern Orth.

91 (27.2%)
6 (1.8%)
12 (3.6%)
22 (6.6%)

8
0
1
17

8
0
0
7

Circuit/state
precedent/other

35 (10.5%)

9

None given/decided
on facts

63(18.9%)
334

Totals

Claim Rejected on Merits

Several lessons emerge from the information on post-Smith judicial reasoning reported in the table above. One is that Smith clearly
did have a significant impact on how lower federal and state courts
decided First Amendment exemptions claims during the period that
immediately followed the Court's landmark ruling. Federal and state
judges applied Smith to evaluate a total of seventy--or twenty-one
percent-of the Free Exercise Clause claims disposed of on the merits. Close examination of the corresponding opinions, moreover, reveals that Smith generally brought bad news for the claimants in those
cases in two related respects. First, a lower court's finding that Smith
controlled was followed in almost every instance by a rejection of the
First Amendment claim at hand. (The only exception involved a
challenge by a suburban Washington, D.C. church to a county school
board's policy of charging churches higher fees to rent school facilities).53 Moreover, most judges who applied the Smith rule readily concluded that incidental burdens no longer raised any serious First
Amendment concern at all. A Pennsylvania federal judge's brusque
treatment of a Catholic hospital's bid for exemption from the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) illustrates how these
judges typically viewed the new Smith standard. Thatjudge wrote:
5' See Fairfax Covenant Church v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 811 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(finding the differential rental fees charged by a school board for religious organizations to be
unconstitutional).
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[The hospital's] motion suggests that application of the ADEA... violates the Free Exercise Clause. However, that claim is precluded by
[Smith], holding that neutral statutes of general applicability do not violate the Free Exercise Clause unless directed specifically at religious pracices.... The ADEA is a neutral law of general applicability to any employer with greater than twenty employees.
It does not target or
discriminate against religious organizations
in
any
way. Consequently,
54
the Free Exercise Clause is not implicated.

No doubt, then, Smith stood as an insurmountable barrier to judicial relief for a considerable number of religious claimants in the
lower federal and state courts. Still, it is clear that those who saw in
Smith the end of all meaningful judicial review in this field dramatically overestimated the impact of the Justices' latest ruling. As Table 2
demonstrates, Smith hardly stood alone as controlling precedent for
Free Exercise Clause claims decided by the lower federal and state
courts. In the forty-three months that initially followed Smith, in fact,
judges ruled on the merits of roughly four of every five free exercise
claims on some other grounds. 55 The compelling interest standard
clearly survived Smith, albeit perhaps in weakened form: thirty-five
claims-roughly ten percent of all post-Smith decisions on the merits-turned on the application of that test. More general forms of
balancing likewise survived Smith, along with standards derived from
the Serbian Eastern Orthodox line of cases and in isolated instances,
Lyng and Lee as well. Most strikingly, the reasonableness approach
exemplified by O'Lone also remained a vibrant part of post-Smith free
exercise law in the lower courts; indeed, the number of claims decided under the O'Lone balancing standard in the immediate postSmith period was greater than those decided under Smith, Lyng, and
Lee combined. Any simple attribution of post-Smith free exercise
losses to the Justices' 1990 decision, therefore, would be a drastic
oversimplification of what was actually a complex pattern of lower
court behaviors that followed in the ruling's wake. Doctrinal pluralism, rather than uniformity, clearly flourished in the early post-Smith
lower courts.
II. DOCTRINAL AMBIGUITY AND THE SURVIVAL
PRE-SMITH STANDARDS

OF

Given this finding of doctrinal plurality, one is necessarily
tempted to ask: Why did judges keep applying First Amendment

Lukaszewski v. Nazareth Hosp., 764 F. Supp. 57, 61 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (internal citations
omitted).
5 This statement necessarily embodies an assumption that Smith was not involved "behind
the scenes" in those decisions for which the writing judge provided no controlling test or standards.
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standards that had been, in the eyes of many Court watchers, so dramatically and completely repudiated in Smith? How did they justify
behaving in a manner so at odds with what many Court watchers have
suggested that the Justices mandated in Smith? One obvious possibility is that some judges may have actually read Smith in a more nuanced manner than many commentators have. Among other things,
then, lower courts could have seized, in many circumstances, on the
two most open-ended doctrinal loopholes in Smith-its "hybrid" exception and its "individualized governmental assessments" exception-to distinguish the Justices' latest pronouncement on the Free
Exercise Clause and follow pre-existing precedents in the field.
A. The Hybrid Exception
As the lower court opinions make clear, the "hybrid" exceptionwhich apparently preserved strict scrutiny for free exercise claims
raised "in conjunction with other constitutional protections 56-was
frequently cited after Smith by litigants hoping to trigger strict scrutiny by bootstrapping other constitutional claims onto their free exercise arguments. Judges, for their part, also occasionally encouraged
such attempts by pointing out the open-endedness of Justice Scalia's
"hybrid" concept. And more importantly, lower courts went even
further in a handful of cases, holding that in light of this exception,
heightened scrutiny of the particular free exercise claims before
them was still required despite Smith. 5s For example, federal judges
on the Fifth Circuit observed in 1991 that "religion-plus-speech" cases
had been specifically excepted from Smith when holding that a religious objector's incarceration for refusing a juror's oath had violated

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
17 See Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 1990)
(summarizing an Eighth Circuit panel's belief that its reversal of summary judgment against a
church's free speech and equal protection challenges to zoning restrictions had "breathe[d]
life back into the Church's 'hybrid rights' claim" on remand); see also Christ Coll., Inc. v. Fairfax
County Bd. of Supervisors, No. 90-2406, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 21680 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1991)
(declining to rule on a parental rights based hybrid claim); Floyd v. Smith, 820 F. Supp. 350,
352 (E.D. Tenn. 1993) (declining to rule on a possible parental rights based hybrid claim because the action was barred by the doctrine of resjudicata); Hinrichs v. Whitburn, 772 F. Supp.
423, 425 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (finding a possible parental rights based hybrid claim was not ripe
for adjudication).
5' See, e.g., In re Baby "K," 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1031 (E.D. Va. 1993) (denying a Virginia hospital's motion, supported by the biological father and a guardian ad litem, for a declaratory judgment allowing termination of medical treatment for an anencephalic child, even though the
biological mother had opposed the motion by citing her religious beliefs in miracles and in the
value of all life).
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the Free Exercise Clause. Similarly, a federal district judge in Texas
applied strict scrutiny to exempt Native American students from a
public school's hair length restriction only after noting that the rule
burdened not only the students' religious beliefs but also their parents' ability to direct their religious and educational development.
The "hybrid" exception bore fruit at times in the state courts as
well. Judges in Vermont, Pennsylvania, and Michigan, for instance,
all cited it explicitly when applying strict scrutiny to resolve intermingled religion and parental rights claims involving state education
regulations and child custody policies.6 And the Supreme Court of
Washington, in a 1992 decision, relied on an especially creative reading of this doctrinal loophole to exempt a downtown Seattle church
on First Amendment
grounds from the city's landmarks preservation
12
ordinance. In that case, the Washington court held, a "hybrid situation" was present because the city's restrictions on external building
renovations burdened both the objecting congregation's free exercise of religion and its "architectural 'proclamation' of religious belief. 6 3 Hence, Yoderstill controlled.

The "hybrid" exception, then, was not without importance in isolated instances. Still, at least in the first three-plus years after Smith,
this potentially expansive loophole fell far short of its clear potential.
Indeed, the dominant trend in the federal and state courts alike in
the immediate post-Smith period was to rule against even the most
straightforward attempts by free exercise litigants to distinguish Smith
in this manner. State appellate courts in Wisconsin, New Mexico,
and Minnesota, for instance, expressly rejected arguments that Smith
was inapplicable to disputes in light of the presence of free exercise-

See Soc'y of Separationists v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
judge's attempt to coerce a prospective juror to make an affirmation despite her sincere religious convictions was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause).
w SeeAla. & Coushetta Tribes of Tex. v. Trs. of the Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp.
1319, 1332-35 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (noting that "the right of parents to participate and direct their
children's education and religious upbringing is firmly established in constitutional doctrine").
" See Vermont v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254, 261 n.8 (Vt. 1990) (holding that Yoder provided
the standard for judging whether criminal charges could be brought against parents who had
failed, for religious reasons, to send their child to a state-accredited school); see also Michigan v.
DeJonge, 501 N.W.2d 127, 134-35 (Mich. 1993), afftd,
470 N.W.2d 433 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)
(applying Yoder, albeit to reach different results on the merits, when determining whether the
First Amendment permitted the state to require parents with religious objections to utilize statecertified teachers in their home schooling programs); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (applying Yoder to two distinct claims that court-imposed child visitation
restrictions unconstitutionally interfered with religious instruction).
62 First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
Id. at 182.
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parental rights combinations. Judges in at least five other cases
likewise declined to recognize hybrids grounded in the First
Amendment's freedoms of expression and association.65 Litigants' efforts to read this doctrinal loophole even more broadly, moreover,
almost always met with judicial resistance. The Ninth Circuit's reaction to yet another expansive hybrid claim-based on a substantive
due process "right to employ"-exemplifies just how unreceptive
lower court judges generally remained to arguments in this vein."
That circuit panel wrote in 1991:
[T]he "right to employ" has been accorded insufficient constitutional
protection to place it alongside the cases Smith cites as examples of "hybrid claims." Those cases are restricted to express constitutional protections such as freedom of speech, and firmly recognized substantive due
process rights such as the privacy right in rearing children. There would
be little left of the Smith decision if an additional interest of such slight
constitutional weight as "the right to hire" were sufficient to qualify for
this exception.
For all its initial potential, then, the hybrid exception ultimately
made little difference for free exercise litigants in the lower courts.
Indeed, by 1993, some judges had begun to question openly whether
"hybrid rights" existed as a separate category of free exercise law at

See In re Marriage of Lange v. Lange, 502 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1993); see also
Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 863 (Minn. 1992);
Health Serv. Div. v. Temple Baptist Church, 814 P.2d 130, 136 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
See Salvation Army v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1990) ("As we
have seen, the primary right of free exercise does not entitle an individual to challenge state
actions that are not expressly directed to religion. Accordingly, the derivative right to religious
association could not entitle an organization to challenge state actions, such as those at issue in
the present controversy, that are not direcdy addressed to religious association."); Jane L. v.
Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537, 1547 (D. Utah 1992) ("Since the Utah law is not aimed at violation of the free exercise of religion, and no additional constitutional rights are violated so as to
meet the 'hybrid rights' exception, this court holds that the Free Exercise claim must be dismissed."); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of The Ohio State Univ., 786 F. Supp. 1308, 1313-14 (S.D.
Ohio 1992) ("The Plaintiff's equal protection claim attempts to piggyback her free exercise
claim, alleging that the defendants' conduct 'creates a state classification of discrimination
against students with her religious and moral beliefs.' This court finds, however, that the curriculum requirements are neutral rules of general applicability, and not aimed at restricting any
religious or moral beliefs. There is no discrimination against religious or moral beliefs.") (internal citations omitted); Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654, 670
(D. Minn. 1990) (rejecting hybrid claims that were grounded in the rights to free exercise, due
process, or equal protection); In reYoung, 152 B.R. 939, 953-55 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993) ("The
Court also finds unpersuasive the church's argument that [the bankruptcy provision] unfairly
discriminates against religious contributions.").
66 SeeAm. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1991) (reviewing the
efforts of the American Friends Service Committee to be exempt from the "employer sanction"
provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which required that employers verify
the legal immigration status of their employees).
67 Id. at 1408 (internal citations omitted).
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ally5 Far from "saving the free-exercise clause and swallowing the
rule"69 of Smith, then, this exception developed in the lower courts
into little more than a constitutional afterthought.
B. The Individualized GovernmentalAssessments Exception
As things turned out, litigants who tried to avoid the brunt of
Smith by pointing to the presence of Sherbert-like mechanisms for individualized assessments generally fared no better. Only twice during
the period under analysis here did lower federal court judges signal
any degree of openness to these particular kinds of claims. And in
one of those cases-a Ninth Circuit decision affirming a federal collective bargaining order against a Catholic school 7°-the deciding tribunal merely hinted at the exception's potential applicability while
basing its decision in Smith anyhow. 71 Thus, ironically, the only time
that a federal court actually distinguished Smith on this ground was in
a case challenging a Native American Church member's criminal indictment for peyote possession-a fact situation as clearly similar to
Smith itself as any found in the lower courts during this period.7 2 Yet
in that case, the deciding New Mexico district court judge concluded
that Sherbert still controlled despite Smith since a statutory distinction
between "Indian" and "non-Indian" peyote users had effectively established
a regime of individualized assessment in the applicable federal
7
law. 3
6'See Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of The Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) ("We
do not see how a state regulation would violate the Free Exercise Clause if it implicates other
constitutional rights but would not violate the Free Exercise Clause if it did not implicate other
constitutional rights.... Such an outcome is completely illogical; therefore, at least until the
Supreme Court holds that legal standards under the Free Exercise Clause vary depending on
whether other constitutional rights are implicated, we will not use a stricter legal standard than
that used in Smith to evaluate generally applicable, exceptionless state regulations under the
Free Exercise Clause."); see also Church of the Open Door v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, No. 65386,
1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1069 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 22, 1993) (rejecting a church's assertion of a straightforward speech-plus-religion "hybrid"as an ill-advised reliance on Supreme
Court dicta).
Richard Duncan, Answering to a HigherAuthoiity,CONN. L. TRIB.,July 1, 1991, at 23.
'0 See NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring a church-owned
school to bargain with a workers' union).
71Id. at 1305 (finding that the individualized governmental assessments exception
may have
been implicated by the facts of the case, yet declining either to rule on the issue or to request
additional argument regarding the applicability of the exception, since the school could not
have prevailed on its free exercise claim even under the more lenient Sherbertstandard).
" See United States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1342 (D.N.M. 1991) (holding that peyote is
not classified as a Schedule I drug when used in bona fide ceremonies in the Native American
Church).
7 See id. at 1341 ("The Drug Enforcement Agency regulation in the present case, unlike the
statute in Smith, is neither neutral nor generally applicable."). More specifically, the New Mexico judge found that the federal statutory exemption for peyote possession by "Indian" members of the Native American Church-but not for "non-Indian" members-had created a Sher-
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In the state courts, the story was much the same. Religious litigants clearly tried on several occasions to distinguish Smith by establishing the presence of "individual assessment" schemes. Further, on
one occasion, a state appellate court suggested in dicta at least a willingness to listen to broad claims in this vein. 4 Even so, only one state
tribunal actually cited this ambiguity for justification while distinguishing Smith and applying strict scrutiny. And notably, even that
sole instance was redundant, since it occurred in the Washington Supreme Court's 1992 decision in First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle-the same landmarks preservation case, noted above, in which a
speech-religion hybrid was also found to be present.75 In other words,
the only time that a state court explicitly held the Sherbert exception
to be controlling in a post-Smith decision on the merits, it made no
difference in the resulting case analysis.
Meanwhile, many attempts by litigants to trigger this exception
fell flat. Two federal courts in Ohio, for example, rebuffed a veterinary student's attempt to distinguish Smith in this manner from her
challenge to Ohio State University's curricular requirement of live
animal surgery. 76 A New Mexico appellate court in 1991 refused to
hold that a Sherbert-like mechanism for case-by-case exemptions was
present in the state's system of day care licensing.77 Panels of the
Second and Ninth Circuits rejected arguments by Quaker and Roman
Catholic organizations that employee classifications in federal immigration law amounted to a Sherbert-like system of individual assessments. Other tribunals denied claims of individualized assessments

bert-like "system of individual exemptions." Id. Notably, the deciding judge also expressed in no
uncertain terms his personal objections to the government's "war on drugs" and to the "erosion" of fundamental constitutional liberties. Id. at 1334.
" See Health Serv. Div. v. Temple Baptist Church, 814 P.2d 130, 135 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991)
(noting that Smith preserved the Sherbert analysis not only for unemployment compensation
cases but for other claims which involve "an administrative balancing of interests," yet declining
to determine whether such an administrative balancing was present in the case at hand).
75840 P.2d 174, 179-80 (Wash. 1992). Beyond finding that the plaintiff church's claim
brought the case within the "hybrid" exception, the Washington Supreme Court also found that
the city's historic preservation scheme incorporated a Sherbert-like individualized assessment,
since the landmarking process included site-specific public hearings and case-by-case determinations of the particular historic and cultural value of city buildings. As written, the city's historic preservation ordinances applied only to structures possessing "significant character, interest or value, as part of the development, heritage or cultural characteristics of the City, state or
840 P.2d at 189 (Utter, J., concurring) (quoting SEATTLE, WASH., CODE
nation...."
§ 25.12.350 (1999)).
'6See Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of The Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 178 (6th Cir. 1993) ("Ohio
State was not required by federal law to alter its curriculum to accommodate [apppellant's] religious beliefs.").
" Temple Baptist Church, 814 P.2d at 136.
7' See Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Committee's claim was not "hybrid"); Intercommunity Ctr. for Justice & Peace v.
INS, 910 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1990) (rejecting the application of Smith).
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in the contexts of school placement testing regulations in Kentucky,
bankruptcy law and civil damages provisions in Minnesota, fire safety
regulations in NewJersey, worker's compensation policies in Virginia,
and government work scheduling in South Carolina as well. 9 In sum,
this exception-like the largely undeveloped loophole for "hybrids"-ultimately amounted to little in the post-Smith federal and
state courts.
In fact, lower court judges were even less receptive to claims of preexisting regimes of individualized governmental assessments than to
claims of hybrid rights. After all, judges' discussions of Smith at least
acknowledged on occasion that Yoder-like hybrid claims were still possible. In contrast, those judges rarely revealed any awareness of the
individualized assessments exception at all.8 ° Moreover, even in those
isolated instances when judges noted its existence, they generally
stressed not its potential expansiveness but rather its narrow origins
in the unemployment compensation field. 81 An unpublished 1991
opinion applying Smith to government work scheduling policy in
South Carolina is illustrative. Thatjudge observed:
Plaintiff relies on Sherbert v. Verner, and contends that under Sherbert and
its progeny, the County must satisfy the "compelling governmental interest-least restrictive alternative" test to justify the rotating schedule's
burdening of plaintiffs religious beliefs. But, as Smith makes clear, neither Sherbert nor its analysis apply to the facts of this case, According to

7 See Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 933-34 (6th Cir. 1991) (refusing to exempt a religious home school student from an equivalency test); Miller v. Drennan,
C.A. No. 3:89-1466-0, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20382, at *24 (D.S.C. June 20, 1991) (stating that
implementation of rotating shift schedule did not violate the Free Exercise Clause); In reYoung,
152 B.R. 939, 955 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993) (holding that Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code
does not violate the Establishment Clause); Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 482 N.W.2d 806,
811 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that a punitive damages statute was not subject to religious
exemption); New Life Gospel Church v. New Jersey, 608 A.2d 397, 404 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1992) (refusing religious exemption from fire safety law); Ballweg v. Crowder Contracting
Co., 427 S.E.2d 731, 733 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to provide religious exemption to
worker's compensation law).
w See, e.g., Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472 (8th Cir. 1990)
(noting that after Smith, "the two remaining paths for advancing a free exercise claim" are hybrid claims and challenges to direct government regulation of religious activity).
"' See Miller, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20382, at *23 ("According to Smith, Sherbert and its progeny are limited to the denial of unemployment compensation benefits to a person whose unemployment was brought about by his religious beliefs or practices."); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794
F. Supp. 1537, 1547 (D. Utah 1992) (stating that the "hybrid rights" exception was not met), see
also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175, 183 n.10 (W.D. Va.
1992) (holding that even where there may be a burden on free exercise in the refusal to fund a
religious organization, the "avoidance of a violation of the Establishment Clause constitutes a
compelling state interest" outweighing any such burden); S. Ridge Baptist Church v. Indus.
Comm'n of Ohio, 911 F.2d 1203, 1213 (6th Cir. 1990) (Boggs, J., concurring) (noting that the
Sherbert test had not been applied outside the context of unemployment compensation); Ballweg, 427 S.E.2d at 733 (noting that the Supreme Court has not used Sherbert to invalidate a governmental action outside of unemployment compensation).
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Smith, Sherbert and its progeny are limited to the denial of unemployment
compensation benefits to persons whose unemployment was brought
about by his religious beliefs or practices. These unemployment cases,
the Smith court stressed, are unique.'

Such a narrow reading of the individualized governmental assessments exception, of course, rendered it irrelevant for all but a small
subset of free exercise disputes.
Neither of the major loopholes in Smith, then, made much of a
difference in the early post-Smith lower courts. As noted earlier, either one offered judges ample opportunities to sidestep Smith and
continue under Sherbert-era free exercise rules; indeed, lower courts
could have easily seized on one or both of them to distinguish Smith
from virtually any type of free exercise case. Nonetheless, these doctrinal "loopholes" ultimately made remarkably little difference in how
federal and state judges resolved post-Smith free exercise claims. This
turn of events was clearly not a function of insufficient opportunity,
since enterprising litigants regularly pressed lower court judges to
expand these loopholes. Nor was it, as a few judges took pains to
point out, a product of the lower courts' universal enthusiasm for the
Justices' new doctrine. For whatever reasons-perhaps judicial role
constraints, professionalism, institutional discipline, policy agreement
or a combination of several such factors-most federal and state
judges who explicitly considered the precedential scope of Smith
minimized its exceptions and maximized its general rule. Consequently, an explanation of why Sherbert-era doctrines remained so vital
in the aftermath of Smith must lie elsewhere.

III. LOWER COURT SILENCE IN THE FACE OF THE COURT'S NEW RULES
So how did lower court judges justify their continued adherence
to Sherbert-era doctrines that have been apparently supplanted by
Smith? In a few instances, they pointed to justifications beyond the
ambiguities just discussed. For example, the Supreme Court of Nevada determined in a 1993 case that First Amendment freedom of association principles should determine whether a capital jury had
83
been improperly told of the defendant's devil worship practices.
Likewise, an Eleventh Circuit panel in 1993 analyzed a First Amendment claim under Sherbert after finding that the law at issue-a Clearwater, Florida ordinance which regulated solicitation only by religious or charitable groups-was neither religion-neutral nor

" Miller, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20382, at *23-*24 (internal citations omitted).
83 Flanagan v. Nevada, 846 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Nev. 1993) ("[T]he jury heard detailed evidence of appellants' participation in a cult. In addition to the First Amendment's protection of
associational ties, this case implicates the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.").
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generally applicable within the meaning of Smith.8 4 O'Lone, in turn,
was used by an Eighth Circuit panel to resolve an Arkansas prison
dispute in 1990; Smith, that court noted caustically, "does not alter the
rights of prisoners; it simply brings the free exercise rights of private
citizens closer to those of prisoners. ' s And in at least four other
cases, lower courtjudges explained that Smith need not be considered
because either the parties before them had not raised the issue or because Smith would make no difference to the outcome. 86
Otherjudges, meanwhile, were considerably less forthcoming with
their thoughts on Smith. A few cited the new precedent only in passing or to support points already made."7 Others mentioned Smith
only in string citations supporting conclusions apparently reached on
other grounds.8 Decisions from the Seventh Circuit and an Arizona

Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1543 (11th Cir.
1993) ("In support of the ordinance the City has pointed to its interests in the prevention of
fraud in charitable solicitations .... The prevention of these ills is legitimate. Nevertheless,
even if the [ordinance's] entangling provisions were capable of justification as narrowly tailored

to serve important or compelling interests, the justifications offered by the City are lacking.").
" Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1171 n.7 (8th Cir. 1990).

86See NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a Catholic
school's claim for exemption from the National Labor Relations Act); Friend v. Kolodzieczak,
923 F.2d 126, 128 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that ajail policy prohibiting contraband in cells

as applied to Roman Catholic prisoners seeking to possess rosaries and scapulars does not violate the Free Exercise Clause); Friedman v. Arizona, 912 F.2d 328, 331 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a prison restriction on facial hair as applied to two OrthodoxJewish inmates does
not violate the Free Exercise Clause); EEOC v. First Baptist Church, No, S91-179M, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14479, at *21 (N.D. Ind.June 8, 1992) (stating that neither party raised Smith nor

would it affect the outcome of the church's claim for exemption from the federal Equal Pay Act
of 1963).
87 See, e.g., Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 320-21 (Colo. 1993) (citing Smith in passing while holding that the First Amendment does not immunize religious organizations from

tort liability for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty); Hope Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 463 N.W.2d 76, 80, 83 (Iowa 1990) (citing Smith only for secondary support when holding under strict scrutiny that the Free Exercise Clause does not entitle
churches to exemption from a state consumer tax); Murphy v. Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness of New Eng., Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 346 (Mass. 1991) (citing Smith in passing while holding
that in the trial of tort claims brought against a religious organization, the trial judge improperly admitted substantial information about the defendant organization's religious beliefs into
evidence); Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794, 798, 801 (Ohio 1992) (citing Smith in reversing a
lower court's custody determination upon finding that the court had improperly considered the
mother's Jehovah's Witness beliefs); Hutchison v. Luddy, 606 A.2d 905 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(citing Smith along with a variety of pre-Smith precedents in concluding that a trial court discovery order can be enforced against a church even if it requires production of materials deemed
secret under church law).
See, e.g.,
Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370, 374-77 (7th Cir. 1991) (rejecting several prisoner
free exercise claims under the O'Lone standard while citing Smith only in a footnote for the
proposition that the Free Exercise Clause had been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); DiCarlo v. Comm'r, 1992 T.C.M. (RIA) 1 92,1381, 92,1384 (citing
Smith along with a variety of other decisions to support the rejection, apparently under Lee, of
an exemption from the federal income tax).
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district court referred to Smith only in vague supporting footnotes s9
And in another instance, a judge in Virginia acknowledged in a footnote that Sherbert had been sharply limited by Smith--and then inexplicably applied strict scrutiny to the pending exemption claim anyhow. 90

Still, the judges in those cases at least mentioned Smith. By contrast,
most judges who applied Sherbert-era standards after Smith never acknowledged the Justices' landmark ruling or its change in doctrinalprinciples
at all. That is, scores of post-Smith opinions discussed controlling free
exercise standards exclusively in pre-Smith terms-as if Smith had simply never occurred. As a result, our inquiry into why lower courts so
frequently applied arguably defunct First Amendment standards is
necessarily limited by a lack of available information. In most instances, federal and state judges simply did not explain it.
A. Applications of Sherbert-Era Standards Without Reference to Smith
1. Strict Scrutiny
In almost two dozen cases overall, lower court judges applied the
Sherbert strict scrutiny methodology to decide exemption claims without making any accompanying references to Smith or its reasoning.
Among these, a good number plausibly could have reflected judges'
unstated conclusions that Smith did not properly apply. For instance,
both the Fourth and the Ninth Circuits applied strict scrutiny after
Smith to the free exercise dimensions of a particular issue-the per" See Arnhold v. McGinnis, No. 92-2522, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 27254, at *8 & n.3 (7th Cir.
Oct. 14, 1993) (relying primarily upon O'Lone in rejecting a claim that prison officials had unconstitutionally interfered an inmate's ability to leave a group religious service. Yet in a footnote, the panel also noted vaguely that the regulation at issue "appears to be a facially neutral
rule of general applicability, devoid of any intent to interfere with religious services held at the
prison," citing Smith as comparison); Presbyterian Church v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1505,
1514 (D. Ariz. 1990) (rejecting the free exercise claim upon finding "a significant and intimate
relationship" between the undercover surveillance by federal immigration authorities at issue
and the government's "compelling interest in regulating its border. . . ." Smith is cited only at
1515 n.8.: "Plaintiffs offer unsatisfactory alternatives to the investigatory measures, asking this
court to effectively rule that otherwise prohibited conduct is free from governmental regulation
if it is accompanied by religious conviction. Yet 'the sounder approach, and the approach in
accordance with the vast majority of our precedents,' is to allow the government to engage in
such activity. 'The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially
harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, "cannot depend on
measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development."'").
o Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 795 F. Supp. 175, 182-83, 183 n.l
(W.D. Va. 1992). In the footnote, the deciding judge pointed out that "with few exceptions,
Sherbert had been limited to those cases involving the denial of unemployment compensation
benefits." Id. But this observation had no apparent effect on the choice of applicable free exercise standards.
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missibility of government-paid assistance for students attending parochial schools-otherwise analyzed primarily on Establishment Clause
grounds.9' Similarly, child custody determinations by state courts in
Idaho and Vermont arguably implicated only the First Amendment's
presumption against facially discriminatory governmental action.92
Meanwhile, state court challenges to home schooling regulations in
Tennessee and felony child endangerment laws in California involved
Yoder-like mixes of free exercise and parental rights issues.93 "Hybrid"

91

In Goodall ex rel. Goodall v. Stafford County School Board, 930 F.2d 363, 369-70 (4th Cir.

1991), a Fourth Circuit panel held that the denial of a publicly-funded interpreter for a deaf
child attending a Christian school did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Citing Sherbert, Thomas, Frazee, and Hobbie for the proposition that substantial infringements on religious exercise
"must be subjected to strict scrutiny and can be justified only by a compelling state interest," the
court concluded that avoiding a violation of the Establishment Clause clearly constituted such
an interest. Id. at 369.
In Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothills School District, 963 F.2d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth
Circuit rejected a free exercise claim that Sherbert required the state to provide a sign language
interpreter to a deaf student enrolled in a Catholic high school. The panel majority applied
strict scrutiny, affirming the district court's summary judgment in favor of the school district
after finding no "less restrictive means" existed by which the state could obey the mandates of
the Establishment Clause. Id.
" Both of these decisions resolved that a non-custodial parent's religious beliefs had been
improperly considered in lower court determinations of child custody. In Osteraas v. Osteraas,
859 P.2d 948, 954 (Idaho 1993), the Supreme Court of Idaho reversed a lower court's award of
primary physical custody of a child to the father after concluding that the custody determination had resulted in part from the trial court's improper consideration of the mother's "lack of
religiousness." Id. at 953. Citing Sherbertfor support, the Idaho high court concluded that the
Free Exercise Clause barred courts from taking religion into account in custody proceedings "in
the absence of a compelling reason" for doing so. Id.
Likewise, in Varnum v. Varnum, 586 A.2d 1107, 1113 (Vt. 1990), the Supreme Court of Vermont rejected a divorcing mother's claim that herJehovah's Witness beliefs and practices had
been improperly considered when a lower court awarded custody of her two children to the
father. In its analysis, the court described the applicable constitutional standard as "a form of
balancing of the relevant interests .... [in which] we must be careful to minimize the degree of
interference with religious liberty and use the 'least restrictive means' to accomplish the legitimate objectives that warrant the interference." Id. at 1111. The court then characterized as
"compelling" the societal interest in protecting and nurturing children. Id.
In Crites v. Smith, 826 S.W.2d 459, 466-67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), a Tennessee appeals
panel held that state minimum educational requirements for home schooling teachers could be
enforced against non-degreed parents seeking to teach their children at home for religious reasons. The court rejected the parents' assertions of a "constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion and to educate their children" after finding that "[t ] he State has a compelling interest
in the proper schooling of all children." Id. at 466. The court cited no precedents in support
of its reasoning but noted cryptically that "[a]uthorities cited by appellants are not found applicable to the present case." Id.
In People v. Rippberger, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1667, 1688 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), a California appeals
panel upheld convictions of two Christian Scientists under the state felony child endangerment
statute after concluding under pre-Smith state court precedent that "the state's interest in protecting and preserving the lives and health of children was compelling enough to justify the inevitable infringement on Christian Science beliefs." Id. at 1689. "Free exercise of religion is not
an absolute right," the court noted, and accordingly it "must be balanced against the rights of
others, including one's children." Id.
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claims involving speech or associational freedoms were at least arguably present in cases involving homeless shelter policies in Indiana,
grand jury practices in New York, criminal
investigations in Texas,
94
and voir dire practices in federal court.
Yet federal and state courts applied the Sherbert strict scrutiny approach, without even mentioning Smith, in a variety of seemingly
paradigmatic free exercise disputes as well. In the federal courts, for
one, district judges in New York and Mississippi ruled well after Smith
that governmental agencies still faced Sherbert's heightened justificatory burden when applying religion-neutral workplace policies to objecting public employees.
Federal courts in Ohio and Maryland
similarly applied strict scrutiny to decide whether religiously affiliated
institutions were subject to federal gender discrimination statutes and
96
state regulations of medical residency programs. In the same manner, a Sixth Circuit panel found late in 1990 that an objecting Baptist
congregation was entitled to an exemption from Ohio's workers'
compensation statutes unless the state could show both compelling
state interest and least restrictive means. 7 In each of these cases, it
" For example, see Center Township of Marion County v. Coe, 572 N.E.2d 1350 (Ind. Ct. App.
1991), which involved a First Amendment free exercise challenge to an Indiana township government's practice of subcontracting its homeless shelter operations to an organization that
conditioned residence in the shelter on regular attendance at religious services. Citing Thomas
v. Review Board of Indiana, 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981), the Indiana court ultimately determined
that the subcontractors' practice effectively placed the township itself in the position of unconstitutionally forcing religious objectors to choose between their First Amendment rights and
their participation in an otherwise public benefits program. Id. at 1360.
Also, see In re CongregationB'naiJonahv. Kuriansky, 576 N.Y.S.2d 934 (N.Y. 1991), which concerned, among other claims, a congregation's asserted First Amendment immunity from enforcement of a subpoena because of its religious duty not to incriminate co-religionists. The
court ultimately concluded that infringement on the congregation's free exercise rights was
justified in this instance as the least restrictive means of furthering the state's "profound interest
in fighting corruption in the Medicaid industry and in enforcing its tax laws." Id. at 935-37.
In Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church v. Morales, 787 F. Supp. 689, 698 (W.D. Tex.
1992), the court notably found, seemingly in contrast to the central thrust of Smith, that the two
statutes' facial neutrality toward religion alone "does not mean any effects on the Plaintiffs are
merely incidental and permissible under the First Amendment." In Fergusonv. Comm'r, 921 F.2d
588, 589 (5th Cir. 1991), the court emphasized the constitutional right to a broad interpretation of the free exercise of religion in the context of oaths or affirmations in legal proceedings.
" E.g., Ben-Siyon Brasch Man-of-Jerusalem v. Hill, 769 F. Supp. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (denying
a free exercise exemption from a city employee leave policy); McGlothin v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (denying a religious exemption for a
teacher's aide from a school's employee dress code).
'6 See EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Schs., 751 F. Supp. 700 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (denying an
exemption from the Equal Pay Act of 1963 for a parochial school which, for religious reasons,
paid married male employees at a higher rate than similarly situated females); St. Agnes Hosp.
of the City of Baltimore v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990) (rejecting a Catholic hospital's challenge to Maryland's requirement of clinical training in family planning procedures as a
condition of state accreditation for medical residency programs).
97 S. Ridge Baptist Church v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 911
F.2d 1203, 1211 (6th Cir. 1990)
(denying a Baptist church's claim that forcing it to pay workers' compensation premiums vio-
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seems that a flat no-exemptions rule from Smith arguably should have
applied. Indeed, other federal tribunals had already found Smith to
control in similar cases. Yet, without giving any explicit attention to
the Justices' latest ruling, federal judges decided these disputes under
the highest level of First Amendment scrutiny instead.
Numerous state courts followed essentially the same path. In
Montana, for example, the state Supreme Court applied heightened
scrutiny in 1992 and 1993 to dispose of seemingly paradigmatic Free
Exercise Clause claims brought by churches against state workers'
compensation laws and generally applicable tort law principles. 98 A
California appellate court in 1992 applied a compelling state interest
analysis under the First Amendment to determine whether a pastor
was exempted from state child abuse reporting statutes. 99 The Mississippi Supreme Court in 1992 used strict scrutiny to evaluate a Baptistaffiliated facility's claim for exemption from state residential home
regulations. °0 A New York state appeals court, in turn, followed Sherbert rather than Smith when ruling on a felony defendant's request for
postponement of his trial so that he could participate in Friday afternoon religious services at Riker's Island.' °'
The opinions, of course, do not tell us why these courts failed to
follow-or even to cite-Smith. But what they do reveal clearly is that
this behavior often had more than just rhetorical significance for the
particular free exercise litigants involved. In fact, lower court neglect
of Smith in some cases meant the difference between a summary denial of the pending claim on the one hand and a serious judicial bal1
ancing of interests on the other. 02
For instance, a New York federal
judge who evaluated the constitutionality of a city employee leave policy in Ben-Siyon Brasch Man-of-Jerusalem v. Hill ultimately denied the
sought-after First Amendment exemption, but the judge did so only
after inquiring into the severity of the religious burden created by the
policy and finding that the claimant felt no substantial pressure to

lated the Free Exercise Clause since it had a scriptural duty to spend money only on biblical
purposes).
St. John's Lutheran Church v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 830 P.2d 1271, 1276 (Mont. 1992)
(citing Miller v. Catholic Diocese of Great Falls, 728 P.2d 794 (Mont. 1986)); Davis v. Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 852 P.2d 640 (Mont. 1993).
People v. Hodges, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1992).
Fountain v. Mississippi ex rel. Miss. Dep't of Health, 608 So. 2d 705 (Miss. 1992).
'0' People v. Williams, 602 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
'0' Citation of the strict scrutiny test did not always mean that the state court provided an indepth analysis of the claim at hand. Specifically, in Fountain,608 So.2d 705, the Supreme Court
of Mississippi arguably gave only lip service to the "buzzwords" of the Sherbert test before rejecting the claim. More specifically, it denied a Baptist-affiliated facility's request for exemption
from state child residential home regulations in 1992 with only a passing observation that such
regulation "must be justified by a compelling interest and be the least restrictive means for protecting [that] interest." Id. at 708 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-29 (1972)).
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0 3
modify his behavior or beliefs.1

Similarly, a federal judge in Ohio

denied a Baptist church's request for exemption from the Equal Pay
Act of 1963 only after concluding that the goal of eradicating sexbased discrimination "substantially outweigh[ed] [the Act's] minimal
impact on defendant's religious beliefs.'
In New York, the state appellate court in the Riker's Island case mentioned above upheld the
trial judge's refusal to postpone Friday jury deliberations only after
considering, among other things, that the jury had already been sequestered for two days and that the defendant himself had failed to
come forth, at the trial judge's request, with suggestions of other accommodations.'0 ' And perhaps most tellingly, the federal judge in a
1992 Mississippi case rejected a teachers' aide's challenge to a public
school's dress code only because the claimant had never informed
her superiors about her religious motivations. 6 Had this notice been
given, the Mississippi court stressed, the employer would have been
obligated under the Free Exercise Clause to "make some accommodation. " ' °7
Had Smith controlled these cases, of course, such factors as the
degree of interference with religion and the nature of the state's
countervailing interests would have been irrelevant. But in these decisions, it was instead the Smith decision itself that apparently made
no difference.
2. Other Balancing Techniques
The same conclusion can be drawn with respect to a number of
other cases where balancing tests continued to appear without any
accompanying mention of Smith. Federal district courts in Florida
and Ohio, for instance, inexplicably evaluated free exercise claims
brought by prisoners under a substantial governmental interest-least
restrictive means standard and a more general balancing approach
distilled from Yoder, respectively.'08 "Undue burden" analyses were
used in three other cases to resolve exemptions disputes involving
Ben-Siyon Brasch Man-of-Jerusalem v. Hill, 769 F. Supp. 97, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Schs., 751 F. Supp. 700, 713 (S.D. Ohio 1990).
0.5Williams, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
McGlothin v.Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D. Miss. 1992).

103

1. Id. at 866.

'08See Harris v. Dugger, 757 F. Supp. 1359, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (denying a Rastafarian inmate an exemption from a Florida Department of Corrections rule requiring short hair after
concluding that the rule was the "least restrictive means of advancing the substantial governmental interest in preventing prison escape"); White v. Morris, 811 F. Supp. 341, 344 (S.D. Ohio
1992) (denying a free exercise challenge to a class action settlement's requirement of raceneutral cell assignments in a penal institution after finding that the governmental interest in
desegregation was an "interest[] of the highest order" (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 215 (1972))).
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Alaska's seasonal restrictions on moose hunting, Missouri's eligibility
rules for interscholastic athletics, and New Jersey's restrictions on
abortion protests.' °9 An Eighth Circuit panel, meanwhile, found a rational basis test appropriate when evaluating a claim for religious exemption from the St. Louis police department's sick leave policy. °
Adding further to this rich mix, a Florida district court applied a selfstyled "amorphous" ad hoc balancing approach to determine
whether county zoning restrictions could be applied to a church-run
homeless shelter.1"
As with the post-Smith applications of strict scrutiny already discussed, each of these claims ultimately boiled down to a request for
exemption from a religion-neutral government policy. As such, Smith
easily could have applied. Yet for whatever reason, it did not-and as
a result, the claimants in each case continued to enjoy the Sherbert-era
premise that facially neutral regulations may still violate the Free Exercise Clause in their application. 2 So, for instance, when a Ninth
Circuit panel in Native Village of Tanana v. Cowper (1991) evaluated
whether Alaska had to permit out-of-season moose hunting for religious ceremonies, it did not reject the claim out of hand; instead, the
tribunal examined in detail both the tribe's belief systems and the

"' See Native Vill. of Tanana v. Cowper, No. 90-35454, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22625, at *7
(9th Cir. Sept. 25, 1991) (finding that the hunting restrictions did not unduly burden the exercise of religion); Beck v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 837 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (E.D. Mo.
1993) (stating that the athletic association's bylaw did not unduly burden the ability to choose
schools based on religious reasons); Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 622 A.2d 891, 900 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (finding that the proper test in determining whether an injunction
barring prayer vigils outside of abortion clinics was whether it was an unreasonable burden on
the free exercise of religion).
"0 In Crain v. Board of Police Commissioners, 920 F.2d 1402, 1404-05 (8th Cir. 1990) the court
denied a religious exemption from a sick leave policy which effectively prevented officers who
were sick at home from attending religious services. Interestingly, neither party in this case
cited Smith to the deciding court. The objecting officers sought strict scrutiny of the claim, but
the panel opted instead to follow Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976), a Supreme Court
substantive due process decision which applied a rational basis test to evaluate the constitutionality of police department grooming requirements. Id. at 1407.
' First Assembly of God of Naples v. Collier County, 775 F. Supp. 383, 386 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
State appellate tribunals in Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Ohio likewise employed ad
hoc balancing methods to decide questions involving child custody law and governmentmandated medical care for minor children. See Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del.
1991) (balancing interests in freedom of religion and parental duty); Bienenfeld v. BennettWhite, 605 A.2d 172 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (same); In re McCauley, 565 N.E.2d 411 (Mass.
1991) (same); In reJ.J., 582 N.E.2d 1138 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (same).
112 See, e.g., Beck, 837 F. Supp. at 1003 (stating that the Free Exercise Clause "does not prohibit the regulation of conduct engaged in for religious reasons, when the regulation is necessitated by reasons independent of the religious nature of the conduct"); Native Vill. of Tanana,
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22625, at *6-*10 (evaluating regulations under the premise that facially
neutral regulations may still violate the plaintiffs' Free Exercise Clause rights).
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availability in state law of other accommodations."3 And when an Illinois court in Bethel Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Village of Morton
(1990) upheld local authority to impose enrollment limits on a parochial school, it pointedly refused to rubber-stamp the city's policy
status quo. 1 14 Instead, the Illinois court declared, the First Amendment imposed a duty on government officials to accommodate religious practices whenever possible; as a consequence, the city had to
raise its existing enrollment cap to better satisfy the religious needs of
the complainants."5
3. Lyng, Lee, and Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Lyng, Lee, and Serbian Eastern Orthodox likewise survived in the unacknowledged shadow of Smith. At least with Lyng and Lee, though,
lower courts generally constrained their continuing value as precedents to only a narrow range of disputes where litigants failed to secure First Amendment relief in any event. So with Lyng, for example,
lower courts used the pre-Smith precedent three times-twice to affirm U.S. Forest Service land management policies and once to uphold a condom distribution program in the New York City public
schools.16 Lee, in turn, was employed only once without accompany-

"3 Native Vill. of Tanana,1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22625, at *6-*10. The free exercise exemption claim brought by forty-three Native Alaskan tribes in this case involved the gathering of
fresh moose meat for memorial potlatch ceremonies. Id. at *6. In concluding that the seasonal
restriction on hunting was not an "undue burden," the deciding panel stressed that the Tribes'
religious beliefs actually permitted the postponement of memorial potlatches-as distinct from
funeral potlatches-for up to one year following the death of the person being commemorated.
Id. at *6-*7. It also noted specifically that the state Supreme Court in Frank v. State, 604 P.2d
1068, 1074-75 (Alaska 1979), had already created an exemption for moose hunting when carried for purposes of preparing funeral potlatches-religious ceremonies which could not be
postponed very long after a person's death. Id. at *9.
'4 Bethel Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Vill. of Morton, 559 N.E.2d 533,
538-39 (IIl. App.
Ct. 1990). Specifically, the Illinois court considered a number of factors in the case-including
the age and physical layout of the school and its surrounding neighborhood, the school's ability
to accommodate additional students, the costs of moving the school to another location, and
the comparable regulation of other schools in the jurisdiction-before concluding that a complete uncapping of enrollment, as the church had requested, "would substantially burden the
Village's interest in protecting the sanctity of the surrounding neighborhood as well as the dignity of the Village's comprehensive zoning plan." Id. at 538. Nonetheless, it also found that
expanding the number of students permitted under the enrollment cap would substantially
lessen the burden on the church's free exercise while adding only marginally to the village's
burdens. Id. at 539. Consequently, the court ultimately split the difference between the parties'
requested remedies: it refused to strike down all enrollment caps, but also ordered the village
to raise the cap from seventy-five to 105 students so as to better accommodate the church's religious needs. Id. at 539.
"5 Id. at 539.
16 See Lockhart v. Kenops, 927 F.2d 1028, 1036-37 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying the pre-Smith
precedent to uphold U.S. Forest Service land management policies); Havasupai Tribe v. United
States, 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1485 (D. Ariz. 1990) (same); Alfonso v. Fernandez, 584 N.Y.S.2d 406,
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ing mention of Smith. In that case, a federal district judge in Colorado ruled that the First Amendment precedent clearly precluded a
church pastor's claim for exemption from the federal income tax."'
Lower court use of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox line of cases, on the
other hand, was much more widespread and favorable to religious interests. Indeed, under Serbian Eastern Orthodox, a range of religious
organizations not only continued to receive serious consideration of
their First Amendment claims after Smith; more often than not, they
ultimately succeeded in securing judicial relief as well. A case in
point is Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals, in which
both a Missouri federal district court and the Eighth Circuit on appeal applied Serbian Eastern Orthodox principles to effectively exempt a
church-affiliated hospital from federal anti-discrimination laws." 8 In
that case, the district court ultimately dismissed a former chaplain's
Tite VII claim of gender discrimination against a Missouri-based
hospital since, under the Free Exercise Clause, judges are not permitted to delve into "the requirements of [the claimant's religious] position and what motivated [her] discharge from her chaplaincy.' '1 9 On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit then affirmed-and despite Smith, took the
district court logic one step further. Under the same First Amendment principles cited below, the appeals court added, the former
church employee was effectively barred from litigating
a claim under
20
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as well.
A similar post-Smith reliance on the Serbian Eastern Orthodox cases
occurred in the Sixth Circuit in Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference.'2' At the district court level, a Michigan judge in 1991
dismissed the civil claims in Lewis-that officials of the Seventh Day
Adventist Church were liable for tort and breach of contract damages
arising out of the improper termination of a pastor-on the grounds
that adjudication would require an impermissible judicial review of
the Church's "internal discipline and government. 22 On appeal the

following year, the Sixth Circuit then affirmed with language suggest-

410-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (deciding a case using the pre-Smith precedent to uphold a condom distribution program in public schools).
"' United States v. Gonzales, No. 89-F-1 740, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3087, at *8 (D. Colo. Feb.
6, 1991).
"' Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 736 F. Supp. 1018 (E.D. Mo. 1990),
afJfd, 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991).
"' Scharon, 736 F. Supp. at 1020 (declining to decide the constitutionality of applying the
ADEA for want of clear congressional intent to apply the statute to religiously affiliated institutions in such a situation). Consequently, the district court disposed of the ADEA claim on statutory grounds. Id. at 1021.
Scharon, 929 F.2d at 361.
' 978 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1992).
Lewis v. Lake Region Conference of Seventh Day Adventists, 779 F. Supp. 72, 75 (E.D.
Mich. 1991).
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ing that the case law applicable to this variety of First Amendment
claim was well established:
The Supreme Court has long held that on matters of church discipline,
faith, practice, and religious law, the Free Exercise Clause requires civil
courts to refrain from interfering with the determinations of the "highest
of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried."
We conclude that the First Amendment bars civil courts from reviewing decisions of religious judicatory bodies relating to the employment of
clergy. Even when, as here, the plaintiff alleges that the religious tribuof its own procedures and
nal's decision was based on a misapplication
23
laws, the civil courts may not intervene.1
These post-Smith affirmations by the Sixth and Eighth Circuits of
the Serbian Eastern Orthodox cases were subsequently cited in two other
rulings immunizing religious organizations from civil claims. Thus in

Young v. Northern Illinois Conference of the United Methodist Church
(1993),24 an Illinois federal district court effectively upheld the firing

of a Methodist minister against Title VII race and sex discrimination
claims; the First Amendment, the Illinois court held, barred "the very
process of inquiry" into whether the church had dismissed the claimant, an African-American woman, out of discriminatory intent rather
than for delivering "bad sermons.' ' 25 Similarly, in Farley v. Wisconsin
Evangelical Lutheran Synod (1993),6 a district court in Minnesota de-

clined to exercise jurisdiction over a Lutheran pastor's tort claims
against associates of his former Bakersfield, California congregation.
"[F]actual scenarios might exist," the Minnesota tribunal noted,
"where resolution of a defamation action against a religious organization would not require the court to undertake an inquiry in violation
of the First Amendment .... 12' But in this case, the court held, adjudication necessarily would have involved an examination of the Lutheran Synod's reasons for terminating the plaintiff-an inquiry into
the internal operations of a religious organization that the Serbian
Eastern Orthodox cases clearly prohibited. 28
State judges displayed a similar loyalty to the Serbian Eastern Orthodox line of cases. State judges in California, Illinois, and Minnesota,
for instance, used these pre-Smith precedents to evaluate claims of
immunity by religious organizations from anti-discrimination statutes

"' Lewis, 978 F.2d at 941-43 (quoting Watson v.Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871)).
1993).
..
' 818 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Ill.
"5 Id. at 1210.
2 821 F. Supp. 1286 (D. Minn. 1993).
7 Id. at 1290.
128Id.
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and property law. 129 Courts in four states extended the Serbian Eastern
Orthodox cases to dis utes involving tort, contract, and corporate law
in the same manner. And as in the federal courts, religious organizations often prevailed on their First Amendment claims in these
cases-despite the fact that Smith arguably should have been applied
so as to preclude free exercise relief instead.13 ' For whatever reason,
lower courts continued to apply Sherbert-era standards-and by failing
to mention Smith in any respect, judges necessarily left others to guess
as to why.

"

See Korean United Presbyterian Church of L.A. v. Presbytery of the Pac., 281 Cal. Rptr.

396, 408 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (refusing on First Amendment grounds to resolve internal church
controversy); St. Mark Coptic Orthodox Church v. Tanios, 572 N.E.2d 283, 293 (Il1. App. Ct.
1991) (finding that courts are required by the First Amendment not to rule on matters of
church doctrine and administration); Molberg v. Apostolic Bible Inst., C9-91-1448, 1992 Minn.
App. LEXIS 354 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1992) (stating that courts may not evaluate claims
that involve delving into church doctrine because of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment); Dignity Twin Cities v. Newman Ctr. & Chapel, 472 N.W.2d 355, 257 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991) (holding as impermissible a civil rights commission's determination that a Catholic
group had violated a city ordinance by denying rental property to a group because they refused
to sign a letter of agreement concerning the Catholic Church's stand on homosexuality).
' See Marshall v. Munro, 845 P.2d 424, 429 (Alaska 1993) (refusing to adjudicate an intrachurch contract claim); Crocker v. Stevens, 435 S.E.2d 690, 694 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (arguing
that civil courts do not infringe on the freedom of religion by allowing adjudication of some
disputes involving church property); Hines v. Turley, 615 N.E.2d 1251, 1259 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
(deciding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because it was attempting to resolve a matter of
church business in violation of the First Amendment); Alicea v. New Brunswick Theological
Seminary, 608 A.2d 218, 222 (N.J. 1992) (writing that enforcing an employment promise that
involved ministerial functions at a university would violate the First Amendment); Welter v.
Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206, 216 (N.J. 1992) (allowing a contract dispute to be litigated
against a religious institution because the employees did not perform ministerial functions);
Alicea v. New Brunswick Theological Seminary, 581 A.2d 900, 908 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1990) (maintaining that the proper route for resolving an employment matter with this religious institution was through an internal grievance process); McElroy v. Guilfoyle, 589 A.2d
1082 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1990) (determining that the trial court lacked subject matterjurisdiction over a dispute between a religious body and a priest because of the religious entanglement of the issues).

"' See, e.g., Dignity Twin Cities, 472 N.W.2d at 357 (holding that where parties have a religious
relationship, an ordinance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation constitutes excessive state entanglement in church affairs); Molberg, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 354, at *8
(upholding summary judgment against an employee of a church because the First Amendment
prevents searching inquiry into religious doctrine); Marshall 845 P.2d at 427-28 (abstaining
from interpreting contractual relationhip of clergy because of First Amendment concerns); St.
Mark Coptic Orthodox Church v. Tanios, 572 N.E.2d 283, 290 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding that
the First Amendment prohibited a civil court from interfering in a suit pertaining to the
church's decisions about employment); Korean United Presbyterian Church of Los Angeles v.
Presbytery of the Pac., 281 Cal. Rptr. 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (reporting that the trial court
erred in not deferring to the decision of the church body in matters of religious governance);
St. Mark Coptic Orthodox Church v. Tanios, 572 N.E.2d 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding that
courts are required by the First Amendment not to rule on matters of church doctrine and administration).
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4. PrisonerClaims and the O'Lone Standards
Finally, pre-Smith standards for evaluating prisoner claims under
the Free Exercise Clause continued to thrive in the unacknowledged
wake of Smith as well. In fact, it is not too much to say that Smith had
virtually no effect at all on lower court behavior in this particular policy
field. Only once-in a 1993 federal district court ruling out of Washington state 132-did
a lower court rely explicitly on Smith in disposing
of an inmate's First Amendment claim.
Meanwhile, federal and
state judges in well over seventy instances resolved prisoner claims
under the O'Lone reasonableness standard without any reference to
Smith at all.1 34 Among these were decisions from seven U.S. Courts of
Appeals-the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth
Circuits-which disposed of claims against prison policies as diverse
as inmate grooming rules,13 5 dietary restrictions, dress codes, per-

132

Ryncarz v. Eikenberry, 824 F. Supp. 1493 (E.D. Wash. 1993).

In Ryncarz, the presiding

federal district judge ruled explicitly that after Smith, a balancing of interests under O'Lone was
no longer necessary. Id. at 1502. Accordingly, the court held that prison officials did not violate the free exercise rights of an inmate by drawing a blood sample over his religious objections. Id. at 1503. Although the inmate called the drawing of blood a "demonic blood ritual,"
the court found that corrections officers acted in accordance with a facially neutral state statute
mandating DNA identification of all incarcerated sex offenders. Id. at 1502.
"' As noted above, a handful of lower federal judges in the post-Smith period did speculate
about the Smith decision's possible implications for prisoner litigation. See, e.g., Arnhold v.
McGinnis, No. 92-2522, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 27254, at *8 n.3 (7th Cir. Oct. 14, 1993) (holding
that restrictions on an inmate's ability to leave prison facilities to attend religious worship did
not violate his constitutional rights); Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 923 F.2d 126, 128 n.1 (9th Cir.
1991) (deferring the question of Smith's effect on prisoners' rights); Hunafa v. Murphy, 907
F.2d 46, 48 (7th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that Smith may cut back substantially on prisoners'
rights); Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1171 n.7 (8th Cir. 1990) (commenting that Smith
does not alter prisoners' rights); Friedman v. Arizona, 912 F.2d 328, 331 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990)
(deferring the question of whether Smith places further limits on prisoners' rights).
'" Included among these opinions is Blair-Bey v. Nix, 963 F.2d 162, 163 (8th Cir. 1992), in
which an Eighth Circuit panel employed a reasonableness standard derived from Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam).
"5 See, e.g., Onstott v. Lewis, No. 91-16456, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 20312 (9th Cir. Aug. 14,
1992) (upholding prohibition of facial hair); Scott v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 961 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.
1992) (upholding a prison regulation requiring the cutting of Rastafarian inmates' hair); Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's grooming code); Collins v. Lewis, No. 89-15664, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 17546 (9th Cir.
July 26, 1991) (upholding prohibition of facial hair); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir.
1991) (upholding a prison's actions in cutting an inmate's hair); Griffin v. Lewis, No. 89-15651,
1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 14812 (9th Cir.July 1, 1991) (upholding prohibition of facial hair); Escalanti v. Lewis, No. 89-16598, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11062 (9th Cir. May 22, 1991) (upholding a
short-hair requirement); McElyea v. Ariz. Dep't of Corr., No. 89-15951, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
2871 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 1991) (upholding prohibition of facial hair); Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907
F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding short hair regulation).
See, e.g.,
A-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding the prison regulations provided reasonable accommodation of Muslim dietary restrictions).
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Federal districtjudges applied O'Lone to decide

claims from at least fifteen states arising out of a full spectrum of institutional procedures, 144 regulations on inmate appearance, 145 prison
...
See, e.g., Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that restrictions on
wearing of headgear were constitutional); Aqeel v. Seiter, No. 92-3037, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
14665 (6th Cir. June 17, 1992) (upholding restriction on wearing of religious headgear).
"' See, e.g., Mustafaa v. Dutton, No. 91-6292, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 5066 (6th Cir. March 18,
1992) (upholding confiscation of prayer oils); Wilson v. Timko, No. 91-16055, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18851 (9th Cir. Aug. 5, 1992) (upholding temporary confiscation of religious items);
Piatt v. Goldsmith, Nos. 89-16036, 89-16038, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 17776 (9th Cir. July 29,
1991) (upholding confiscation of personal items); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir.
1991) (upholding confiscation of medicine bag and talisman).
"' See, e.g., Richards v. White, 957 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting plaintiff inmate's claim
that his assignment with a homosexual cellmate violated his constitutional right to practice his
religion).
14 See, e.g., Robbins v. Grant, No. 92-15453, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 4489 (9th Cir. March 3,
1993) (upholding prohibition of a meeting in a prison chapel between two Buddhist inmates in
the interest of security); Frost v. Agnos, No. 91-15803, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28086 (9th Cir.
Oct. 26, 1992) (holding that prohibiting a close custody inmate from attending congregate religious services did not violate his constitutional rights); A1-Shabazz v. Norris, Nos. 89-6145, 896149, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 12285 (6th Cir. May 31, 1991) (upholding requirement of outside
sponsor to supervise religious services, so long as the rule is applied neutrally); Al-Alamin, 926
F.2d 680 (finding that a prison's failure to provide a Muslim chaplain or imam, along with several other restrictions on religious observance, did not violate Muslim inmates' constitutional
rights); Clifton v. Craig, 924 F.2d 182 (10th Cit. 1991) (upholding both prison's refusal to allow
group of Christian inmates to hold separate services apart from other Christian groups and
prison's restrictions on meeting times for Bible study); Benjamin, 905 F.2d 571 (upholding requirement of outside sponsor to supervise religious congregations). See also Frederick v. Murphy, No. 91-3699, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 411 (7th Cir. Jan. 12, 1993) (affirming district court's
summary judgment against an inmate claiming that prison restrictions on religious practice violated his civil rights); Blair-Bey v. Nix, 963 F.2d 162 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying a reasonableness
standard derived from Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam));Johnson v. Bruce, No.
91, 3271, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6825 (10th Cir. Apr. 9, 1992) (affirming district court's dismissal of a free exercise claim under O'Lone "for substantially the reasons given by the district
court").
141See, e.g., Nobles v. Hoffman, No. 92-2692, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 19958 (7th Cir. Aug. 2,
1993) (finding that disruption of an inmate's mail delivery did not violate his civil rights).
12 See, e.g., El Amin v. Brown, No. 90-1488, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2162 (6th Cir. Feb. 18,
1991) (upholding prohibition of release from work assignments to attend religious services).
14 See, e.g., Noguera v. Rowland, No. 90-15405, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 18367 (9th Cir. Aug. 5,
1991) (upholding prohibition of conjugal visits for condemned inmates).
See, e.g., Boreland v. Vaughn, No. 92-0172, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2941 (E.D. Pa. March 3,
1993) (rejecting an inmate's objections to blood testing requirement); Thacker v. Dixon, 784 F.
Supp. 286 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (upholding a prison's refusal to alter records to reflect inmate name
change).
"5 For cases concerning prison dress codes, see, e.g., Blair-Bey v. Nix, No. 4-87-CV-70478, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21066 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 10, 1991) (upholding restriction on wearing of religious headdresses); Aqeel v. Seiter, 781 F. Supp. 517 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that disciplining
an inmate for refusing to remove a religious headgarment did not violate his constitutional
rights); Abbott v. Smaller, No. 88-2800, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11961 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 1990)
(finding prohibition on wearing of religious headgarments unconstitutional). For a case con-
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living conditions,'46 and inmate activities147 as well. State courts in
Wisconsin and New York, meanwhile, applied the OLone reasonableclaims reness test (without regard to Smith) to dispose of prisoners'
garding participation in group religious exercises.' 4s Courts in Ohio,
cerning prison grooming policies, see Wellmaker v. Dahill, 836 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Ohio 1993)
(upholding short hair requirement against an inmate's objection that the rule violated his free
exercise rights).
' For cases concerning restrictions on inmate access to or possession of property, see, e.g.,
Clifton v. Nared, No. 89-3053-R, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4785 (D. Kan. March 8, 1993) (upholding
confiscation of personal property from inmate's cell); Escobar v. Landwehr, 837 F. Supp. 284
(W.D. Wis. 1993) (upholding limits on amount and kind of personal property inmates may possess); Brightwell v. Matty, No. 90-6951, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18438 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 1992)
(upholding denial of religious articles for penological reasons); Brightwell v. Roth, No. 90-6942,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11544 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1992) (unreported) (upholding restriction on
number of religious books inmate could request); Candelaria v. Coughlin, 787 F. Supp. 368
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (upholding deprivation of a string that inmate claimed had religious significance); Ladd v. Stotts, No. 92-3232-DES, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19017 (D. Kan. Nov. 17, 1992)
(denying relief to plaintiff who complained that he was denied access to religious materials
while in disciplinary segregation); Munir v. Scott, No. 87-CV-73711-DT, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20371 (E.D. Mich. March 27, 1992) (upholding denial of request to purchase religious oils);
Stewart v. Irvin, No. 91-CV-515E(M), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10431 (W.D.N.Y. June 30, 1992)
(upholding restrictions on receipt of personal items); Hammer v. King, No. CS-90-0023-JBH,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10481 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 6, 1990) (upholding confiscation of inmate's
personal property, whether religious or not); McClaflin v. Pearce, 743 F. Supp. 1381 (D. Or.
1990) (upholding restrictions on personal property); Savko v. Rollins, 749 F. Supp. 1403 (D. Md.
1990) (upholding prison regulations that limited the quantity and types of personal property
inmates were permitted and provided for their confiscation if necessary).
For cases concerning inmate diet, see Salaam v. Collins, 830 F. Supp. 853 (D. Md. 1993); Cooperv. Rogers, 788 F. Supp. 255 (D. Md. 1991).
"' For cases involving claims of inadequate access to religious services, facilities, or counselors, see, e.g., Salaam, 830 F. Supp. 853; Scott v. Stotts, No. 92-3310-DES, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10845 (D. Kan. July 15, 1993); Akbar v. Borgen, 803 F. Supp. 1479 (E.D. Wis. 1992); Arnhold v.
McGinniss, No. 91 C 20111, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11636 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 1992); Matty, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18438; Roth, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11544; Eastland v. Nelson, No. 92 C 206,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10324 (N.D. I11.July 8, 1992); Jones-El v. Davis, CA 89-0572-AH-C, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12129 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 21, 1992); Martin v. Lane, No. 88 C 9600, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1949 (N.D. I11.Jan. 23, 1992); Waldron v. Lesza, No. 89 C 5101, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2694 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 1992); Blair-Bey, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21066; Boles v. Kalmanek, No. 90 C
20191, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12111 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 25, 1991); Fowler v.Jones, No. 85-0212-BHC, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10288 (S.D. Ala.June 25, 1991); Hobbs v. Pennell, 754 F. Supp. 1040 (D.
Del. 1991);Johnson v. Bruce, 771 F. Supp. 327 (D. Kan. 1991); Lee v. City of Philadelphia,No. 889083, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2493 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 1991); Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp.
715 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Phelps v. Dunn, 770 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Ky. 1991); Feetwood v. Toombs, Nos.
G88-254 CA, G88-578 CA, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13359 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 9, 1990); Griffin v.
Coughlin, 743 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D.N.Y. 1990); McClaflin, 743 F. Supp. 1381; Stroud v. Roth, 741 F.
Supp. 559 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
See also Grant v. Matthews, No. 89-3194-R, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10258 (D. Kan. June 12,
1992) (concerning inmate work assignment); Stafford v. Harrison, 766 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Kan.
1991) (concerning required participation by inmate in alcohol rehabilitation program as precondition for parole); Yemani v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., No. 88 C 2618, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9996
(N.D. Ill. July 31, 1990) (concerning inmate access to correspondence).
' See, e.g., Jackson v. Coughlin, 595 N.Y.S.2d 631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (rejecting an inmate's
First Amendment challenge to a prison policy prohibiting group or demonstrative prayer practices in the prison recreation yard and gymnasium); Casteel v. McCaughtry, 484 N.W.2d 579
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Oklahoma, and Delaware similarly used O'Lone to decide claims involving access to spiritual counselors, prison grooming policies, and
restrictions on cell living arrangements.

As I have already discussed,

the logic of Smith seemingly brought the continued vitality of the
O'Lone "reasonableness" standard into question. But if one were
judging from virtually every post-Smith federal and state court decision in the field, one would never be able to tell.
Of course, as the outcome statistics in Table 2 illustrate, the vast
majority of inmate claims still failed during this period even under
pre-Smith standards-an unsurprising finding given both the minimal
requirements of OLone itself and the frivolous nature of many prisoner petitions. Even so, the corresponding opinions suggest quite
clearly that prisoner claims were often given more serious consideration in the federal and state courts than the conventional reading of
Smith would have required. For instance, a Kansas federal district
judge in Grant v. Matthews (1992) dismissed under O'Lone a Rastafarian inmate's claim that he was wrongfully punished for refusing to
handle soup as a cafeteria worker in the Leavenworth penitentiary.' 5
The court so ruled, however, only after finding that prison officials
had taken several steps, such as reassigning the inmate from meathandling duties, providing plastic gloves, and consulting with an outside expert on Rastafarianism, to accommodate the inmate's religious
objections.1 5 1 Similarly, an Ohio district judge in Wellmaker v. Dahill
rejected an inmate's free exercise challenge to a prison hair-length
regulation under O'one in 1993.152 Yet far from dismissing the claim
out of hand, the court instead "weigh[ed] and balance[d]" several
factors-including administrators' concerns about security, inmate
safety, and the ready availability of other ways for the inmate to observe his religious faith-before concluding that the prison's "legiti-

(Wisc. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting an inmate's claim that his temporary removal from the general
prison population resulted in an unconstitutional deprivation of access to religious services).
"' See, e.g., Delaware v. Red Dog, No. IN91-02-1495, 1993 Del. Super. LEXIS 96 (Del. Super.
Ct. March 2, 1993) (denying a death row inmate access to his choice of spiritual counselor because it would pose an undue burden on prison officials and because he is not left bereft of
spiritual counselors); Brown v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. and Corr., No. 89AP-581, 1990 Ohio App.
LEXIS 2654 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1990) (applying the balancing test to deny a prisoner's
request to clean his cell of human waste before prayer); Trussel v. Maynard, 813 P.2d 532 (Okla.
Civ. App. 1991) (holding that restricting a prisoner's beard to one inch in length is a valid
compromise between freedom of expression rights and the government's legitimate penological interests).
Grant, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10258, at *10.
Id. at *8-*9.
...
Wellmaker v. Dahill, 836 F. Supp. 1375, 1387 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
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mate penological interests" overrode the prisoners' religious objecs
tio n s . 1.
Even more tellingly, prisoners in a handful of post-Smith cases ultimately prevailed on the free exercise merits under O'Lone. For instance, federal judges in Alabama, New York, and Iowa all ruled in favor of inmates after concluding that prison officials had not done
enough to secure the inmates' First Amendment rights of access to
religious counseling or group services. 154 An Eighth Circuit panel in
another case, after noting pointedly that the O'Lone reasonableness
standard "is not toothless," ordered Arkansas prison officials to recognize an Islamic prisoner's new name despite a general policy of using only the committed names of inmates for prison business. "1 In

151

Id. at 1386. That lower courts had not simply foreclosed the possibility of prisoner success

on a free exercise claim is further evidenced by several post-Smith federal court opinions which
did not reach the free exercise merits. See, e.g., Lafevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1991)
(reversing the dismissal of an inmate claim after finding that prison officials did notjustify their
failure to provide a vegetarian diet to inmates who could not eat meat for religious reasons); Ali
v. Dixon, 912 F.2d 86, 90 (4th Cir. 1990) (reversing summaryjudgment against an inmate's free
exercise claim since prison officials did not offer any penological justification for a policy barring the registration of inmate name changes on prison trust accounts); Fair v. Brown, No. K85535, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13428 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 4, 1990) (declining to summarily dismiss a
free exercise challenge to a Michigan prison policy allowing male guards to pat down female
inmates and observe them unclothed since an alternative policy suggested by the claimants indicated that perhaps the O'Lone reasonable relationship standard had not been satisfied); see
also Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir. 1991) (reversing summary judgment for the
prison because plaintiff inmate had raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding both the
reasonableness of defendants' policy requiring external evidence of religious beliefs and their
determination that plaintiffs beliefs were insincere); Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46 (7th Cir.
1990) (reversing summary judgment for the prison because the determination of whether the
benefit to the prison of serving pork outweighed the cost of the plaintiff inmate having to give
up meals was too close a question for summary judgment to be appropriate).
District courts in Alabama and New York thus ruled against prison officials after concluding that their proffered security and health justifications were insufficient to outweigh inmates'
First Amendment rights of access to communal religious services. SeeJones-El v. Davis, No. CA
89-0572-AH-C, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12129, at *24-*27 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 21, 1992) (finding that
Alabama prison officials had acted unreasonably under OLone when, in response to security
concerns, they had prohibited adherents of the Moorish Science Temple of America from holding services in the prison chapel); Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F. Supp. 715, 742 (W.D.N.Y.
1991) (holding that an H1V-positive inmate's free exercise rights had been violated by application of "an ad hoc policy" when her segregation from the general prison population for medical
reasons prevented her from attending communal Catholic services); see also Blair-Bey v. Nix, No.
4-87-CV-70478, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21001, at *2 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 10, 1991) (ordering Iowa
State Penitentiary officials to hire a Moorish Science Temple consultant after accepting a magistrate judge's findings that the prison's provision of only one religious advisor for all Islamic inmates was unreasonable); Griffin v. Coughlin, 743 F. Supp. 1006, 1025 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (ordering New York prison officials to revise their clergy visitation policies after finding that inmates in
protective custody were entitled under OLone to "truly private meetings" with religious advisors
rather than conversations held only through cell bars).
155 Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168, 1171 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott,
490 U.S. 401, 414 (1989)). In this case, the circuitjudge ordered prison officials to add the inmate's Islamic name to his clothing and to deliver mail addressed to the new name.
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late 1990, meanwhile, the Second Circuit found a New York prison
policy requiring haircuts for all new male inmates inapplicable to objecting Rastafarians since the prison's asserted interest-obtaining
clear photographs of prisoners' facial features for use in the event of
escape-could have been equally served by pulling back the inmates'
hair instead. 5 6 And in Michigan, a federal district judge in 1992
struck down a state prison's ban on inmates' possession of religious
oils on the grounds that "penological concerns could have easily been
addressed by a less restrictive policy .

,,1 7

What such prisoners' rights decisions reveal most clearly is that,
despite what could have occurred after Smith, lower courts generally
continued to operate under the Sherbert-era premise that inmates retained viable-albeit far from expansive-constitutional rights to exemptions from prison policies by virtue of their religious beliefs.
That is, at the same time that Smith was often being applied as a categorical bar to a wide variety of paradigmatic free exercise claims outside of the prison context, the decision made no difference at all in
how judges in the vast majority of instances addressed analogous
claims arising in the unique context of prison life. In this particular
policy area, then, the pre-Smith judicial approach to free exercise liberties not only survived the Justices' bold policy retreat in the spring
of 1990 but indeed, it flourished quite nicely.
CONCLUSION: REASSESSING THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF SMITH

At least four basic conclusions emerge from the foregoing analysis. First, it is clear that the state of First Amendment free exercise
rights during the Sherbert era was considerably more complex than
much of today's commentary on the field suggests. By the spring of
1990, when Smith was decided, the First Amendment's protections for
religiously motivated conduct may have already entered a new period
of decline. Not only had a number of significant restrictions on religious conduct survived the Court's "strict" scrutiny test in recent

Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 575 (2d Cir. 1990).
Munir v. Scott, No. 87-CV-73711-DT, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20371, at *33 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
27, 1992). The Sixth Circuit reversed this holding, but only upon finding that the prison had
articulated a sufficient number of legitimate security considerations to meet O'Lone's requirements. See Munir v. Scott, No. 92-1693, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 29572, at *407 (6th Cir. Nov. 10,
1993). In addition to the cases discussed in the text, a prisoner plaintiff also prevailed on his
free exercise claim under the O'Lone standard in Abbott v. Smaller, No. 88-2800, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11961 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 1990). In this decision, the district court held that a prison
guard had unconstitutionally prohibited an inmate from wearing a Muslim head covering during dinner. Id. at *6. This holding, however, turned on the particular guard's behavior, rather
than the prison's general policies: the court found that prison regulations actually permitted the
wearing of kufis at dinner, and that the guard's action was an "unreasonable and arbitrary" action in violation of institutional rules. Id. at *12.
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years, but at the same time, the Justices had carved out several discrete exceptions to the general Sherbert strict scrutiny standard by
early 1990 that left religious freedoms in several contexts open to significant governmental restriction. As a result, one could reasonably
argue, the respective roles of the judicial and "political" branches of
government in protecting free exercise liberties had already shifted to
a considerable degree by the time that the Justices announced their
decision in Smith. Religious persons and groups, that is, had already
come to depend in large part on administrators and legislation to
protect them from burdens created by generally applicable public
policies. Judges and adjudication, meanwhile, had clearly become
less prominent players in the field.
Second, Smith itself did not necessarily represent the wholesale
repudiation of judicial balancing that the conventional wisdom now
suggests it to be. In the eyes of many, of course, the reasoning in
Smith was nothing short of catastrophic for those seeking judicial protection from majoritarian insensitivity or ignorance. After Smith, this
view assumes, First Amendment exemptions are simply unattainable.
Yet a close look at the Smith majority's reworking of precedents suggests that, while the decision unquestionably marked a retreat from
previously controlling standards, its incomplete and convoluted reasoning left unresolved some fundamental questions about the new
doctrine's scope and meaning. Thus, far from eliminating policy discretion for lower courts and other authoritative interpreters, Smith instead created significant new "wiggle room" in the controlling First
Amendment standards for religious liberty. Whether Smith actually
meant the end of substantive constitutional protection of these rights
accordingly depended quite a lot on how others reacted to that decision and its ambiguities.
Third, the evidence on claim outcomes from the early post-Smith
period hardly supports the view that the ruling triggered a wholesale
abandonment of free exercise liberties in the lower courts. To be
sure, judges ultimately rejected the vast majority of First Amendment
claims adjudged on the merits after Smith. Yet, it turns out, not all
claims failed in the wake of the Justices' decision. To the contrary, a
remarkable number of claimants still prevailed in First Amendment
litigation even after the Supreme Court's inhospitable change in constitutional doctrine. In fact, when viewed in light of findings from
earlier studies, the aggregate winning percentage for post-Smith
claims appears more a continuation of past behavioral patterns than a
radical break from them. Success in court with a claim for religious
exemption, after all, was really the exception rather than the rule
long before Smith.
Fourth, the impact of Smith on the legal standards applied by
lower court judges was considerably more attenuated than critics had
predicted. Only a minority-roughly one in five-of post-Smith losses
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in the federal courts can be attributed clearly to the Court's 1990 decision. Meanwhile, despite Justice Scalia's rhetorical assault upon the
very notion of special First Amendment sensitivity toward incidental
religious burdens, lower federal courts after Smith continued to
evaluate claims under a variety of tests grounded in precisely such
Sherbert-era premises. Judicial balancing continued to show significant resilience in free exercise law in the form of strict scrutiny, "undue burden" analysis, ad hoc balancing, and, most prominently in
quantitative terms, the OLone reasonableness approach for prisoner
petitions. Religious organizations were still treated differently from
secular ones in numerous instances under the Serbian Eastern Orthodox
line of cases as well. Hence, federal and state courts in a variety of
contexts continued to presume that government officials faced some
First Amendment burden of justification when applying facially neutral policy to religious objectors. Smith's categorical reasoning, contrary to critics' expectations, clearly did not pre-empt the doctrinal
field.
Interestingly, the doctrinal ambiguities in Smith ultimately did not
go very far in explaining the continued use by federal and state
judges of various pre-Smith constitutional standards in the period under review. Indeed, the exceptions in Smith for "hybrid" claims and
"individualized governmental assessments" apparently made little
practical difference in how the bulk of free exercise claims were
evaluated in the lower courts. Yet it is clear that post-Smith free exercise cases were decided in a remarkably pluralistic doctrinal environment. This jurisprudential condition had several practical implications. One was that free exercise claims quite similar in substance
sometimes ended up being evaluated under substantially different
constitutional tests during the period under consideration. For instance, in October 1991, a federal district court in Florida evaluated a
church's claim for exemption from local zoning regulations under an
ad hoc balancing test; by contrast, both an Eighth Circuit federal appellate panel in 1990 and a Connecticut state trial court in 1992 resolved seemingly comparable zoning questions under Smith. 151 Similarly, challenges by public employees to work-leave policies were
evaluated under a rational basis test by the Eighth Circuit in late 1990

' Compare First Assembly of God of Naples v. Collier County, 775 F. Supp. 383, 385-88
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (using two threshold tests and a balancing test to consider whether zoning
regulations improperly barred operation of a shelter on church property), with Cornerstone
Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472-73 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a zoning
ordinance excluding churches from a commercial and industrial zone does not regulate religious worship because the ordinance applies to all land use), and Grace Cmty. Church v. Town
of Bethel, No. 30 69 94, AC 11312, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2131, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. July
16, 1992) (using Smith to determine that a zoning ordinance requiring churches to obtain special permits to construct church buildings in residential zones was not unconstitutional).
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and under a form of heightened scrutiny by a New York federal district court in 1991.159

Prisoner challenges, moreover, were decided

under (1) a version of intermediate scrutiny by a Florida federal district court in 1991; (2) a Yoder balancing analysis by an Ohio federal
district judge in 1992; (3) the Smith rule by a federal district judge in
Washington state in 1993; and (4) the O'Lone reasonableness standard in almost every other state and federal case.160

Hence in the

end, Smith hardly eliminated doctrinal variability from First Amendment free exercise jurisprudence. Arguably, the decision instead
added new grounds for confusion and inconsistency in the lower
courts.
Doctrinal inconsistencies also developed at times within particular
jurisdictions, as lower court judges apparently failed to follow authoritative interpretations of Smith made by their institutional superiors. For instance, the above-mentioned New York federal district
court applied heightened scrutiny to a city leave policy without mentioning Smith in August 1991-at least eleven months after the Second Circuit clearly extended Smith to non-criminal matters. 16 Likewise, even though an Eighth Circuit panel ruled in 1990 that both
civil and criminal laws of general applicability "will not be subject to
attack under the free exercise clause" in light of Smith, a federal district judge in Missouri never mentioned Smith when applying an undue burden analysis to high school athletic participation restrictions
in late 1993.162 A similar situation probably developed in the Fifth
Circuit as well, where a Mississippi federal district court found Sherbert
to provide the controlling doctrinal standard in a challenge to school
dress codes, notwithstanding a circuit ruling that had arguably extended Smith to cover such non-criminal policy areas the previous
163
year.

159 CompareCrain v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 920 F.2d 1402, 1406-09 (8th Cir. 1990) (concluding that the police department's sick leave regulation should be reviewed for a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest), with Ben-Siyon Brasch Man-of-Jerusalem v. Hill, 769 F. Supp.
97, 102 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that a leave policy offends the First Amendment only if the policy puts "substantial pressure" on the employee to alter his religious observance).
'w Harris v. Dugger, 757 F. Supp. 1359, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 1991); White v. Morris, 811 F. Supp.
341, 344 (S.D. Ohio 1992); Ryncarz v. Eikenberry, 824 F. Supp. 1493, 1502 (E.D. Wash. 1993).
6' See St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of NewYork, 914 F.2d 348, 354 (2d Cir. 1990) (using
Smith to hold that a landmark preservation law was not an unconstitutional burden on free exercise); see also Intercommunity Ctr. for Peace and Justice v. INS, 910 F.2d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 1990)
(using Smith to hold that INS employment regulations did not violate the Free Exercise Clause).
162CornerstoneBible Church, 948 F.2d at 472; Beck v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 837
F. Supp. 998, 1003 (E.D. Mo. 1993).
113 See McGlothin v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 829 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D. Miss.
1992). Compare Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that Plaintiffs free
exercise argument is foreclosed by Smith), with United States v. Allibhai, 939 F.2d 244, 249-50
(5th Cir. 1991) (extending the Smith holding to a case not involving free exercise).
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Finally, doctrinal pluralism in numerous jurisdictions created a
most curious anomaly in post-Smith free exercise law: prisoner
claims-traditionally given considerably less judicial scrutiny than
most claims brought by civilians-sometimes received more stringent
judicial scrutiny after Smith than did analogous non-prisoner claims
brought in thatjurisdiction. To give just one example, a Sixth Circuit
federal appeals panel applied Smith in early 1991 to hold that Kentucky's regulations of home schooling were "simply not subject to a
free exercise challenge" by objecting parents.16 4 Yet, despite this ruling and two subsequent extensions of Smith into non-criminal policy,
Sixth Circuit panels later held repeatedly-albeit in unpublished decisions-that O'Lone still obliged prison officials to accommodate65
prisoners' religious interests whenever doing so was reasonable.1
Federal district courts continued to apply O'Lone as controlling
precedent within the circuit as well. 66 As a result-and the Sixth Circuit was hardly alone in this regard_6 7-the differential of civilian free

'6 Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd.of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 932 (6th Cir. 1991).
'65
See Aqeel v. Seiter, No. 92-3037, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14665, at *2 (6th Cir. June 17,
1992) (noting that in a previous ruling, the court supported Aqeel's alleged First Amendment
right to wear a religious garment in the prison because of a lack of showing of security concern); Mustafaa v. Dutton, No. 91-6292, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 5066, at *5 (6th Cir. Mar. 18,
1992) (holding that allowing a particular religious practice would be impracticable in the
prison); AI-Shabazz v. Norris, No. 89-6145, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 12285, at *4-*6 (6th Cir. May
31, 1991) (ordering reasonable accommodation for prisoners' observance of the Muslim faith).
See, e.g., Wellmaker v. Dahill, 836 F. Supp. 1375, 1380-81 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (denying that
a prison rule requiring regular haircuts infringes on an inmate's constitutional rights); Munir v.
Scott, No. 87-CV-73711-DT, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20371, at *33-*34 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 1992)
(determining that accommodation could be made for the use of religious oils within the confines of prison regulations); Aqeel v. Seiter, 781 F. Supp. 517, 519-21 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (denying that a prison rule requiring removal of religious garment infringes on an inmate's constitutional rights); Boles v. Kalmanek, No. G88-541 CAI, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12122, at *15 (W.D.
Mich. Aug. 27, 1991) (holding that the temporary denial of permission for group religious services did not violate Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights); Phelps v. Dunn, 770 F. Supp. 346, 35253 (E.D. Ky. 1991) (holding that a prison rule preventing homosexual inmates from participation in religious chapel services was constitutional, as it was reasonably related to maintaining
prison security).
'6'
Examples of decisions applying O'Lone to prisoner cases even after the relevant court of
appeals extended Smith into non-criminal law can be found in the Second, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits and arguably the Fifth Circuit as well. See, e.g., Scott v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 961 F.2d 77,
80 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding a prison hair grooming regulation on the grounds that any constitutional right infringement is outweighed by prison security interests); Powell v. Estelle, 959
F.2d 22, 24-25 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding the district court's ruling that prisoner's free exercise rights were not infringed by prison regulations requiring hair grooming); Candelaria v.
Coughlin, 787 F. Supp. 368, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying that a prisoner's free exercise rights
were thwarted by a guard cutting the string on his identification card); Stewart v. Irvin, No. 91CV-515E(M), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10431, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. June 30, 1992) (denying that an
inmate's religious freedom has been denied by way of a prison rule regulating the goods that
may enter the prison); Arnhold v. McGinniss, No. 91 C 20111, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11636, at
*5 (N.D. Il.June 12, 1992) (rejecting inmate's claim that a requirement to be seated at a particular time infringed upon his free exercise rights); Eastland v. Nelson, No. 92 C 206, 1992 U.S.
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exercise claims under Smith and prisoner claims under O'Lone ended
up turning the pre-Smith framework for judging free exercise burdens
precisely on its head.

Dist. LEXIS 10324, at *5 (N.D. III. July 8, 1992) (holding that an inmate's wish to hang a sheet
over his cell door during prayer is not outweighed by the prison's interest in maintaince of
safety, thus denying an infringement on inmate's free exercise right); Martin v. Lane, No. 88 C
9600, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1949, *11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 1992) (asserting that preserving prison
safety is a justifiable reason for halting communal religious gatherings among inmates); Waldron v. Lesza, No. 89 C 5101, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2694, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 1992) (holding that an inmate's constitutional rights are not infringed upon if he is prevented from attending a religious service in the interest of prison safety); Blair-Bey v Nix, No. 4-87-CV-70478, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21001, at *2 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 10, 1991) (ordering prison officials make some
reasonable accommodations for inmates' free exercise of religion).

